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The Right to Travel: Breaking 
Down the Thousand Petty 
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Deportation Laws 
 




The vanishing began Wednesday night, the most 
frightened families packing up their cars as soon 
as they heard the news. They left behind mobile 
homes, sold fully furnished for a thousand 
dollars or even less. Or they just closed up and, 
in a gesture of optimism, left the keys with a 
neighbor. Dogs were fed one last time; if no home 
could be found, they were simply unleashed. 
Two, [five], [ten] years of living here, and then 
gone in a matter of days, to Tennessee, Illinois, 
Oregon, Florida, Arkansas, Mexico—who knows? 
Anywhere but Alabama.1 
 
This mass exodus from Albertville, Alabama was not the result 
of a natural disaster or fears of an invasion by hostile forces. 
Instead, the residents of Albertville fled Alabama exactly in the 
manner the state legislators intended when Alabama passed 
H.B. 56. As Alabama Senator Scott Beason explained, 
 
[a]ll these bills are designed for people to say, 
you know what, they’re going to try to enforce the 
 
* Visiting Associate Professor of Clinical Law, University of Minnesota 
Law School.  I would like to thank David Rodriguez, Mark Noferi, Allison 
Tirres, Anita Madalli, Hiroshi Motomura,  and Matthew Lamkin, not only for 
1. Campbell Robertson, After Ruling, Hispanics Flee an Alabama Town, 
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law here in this state. And maybe we need to 
move back to our home country. Or maybe we 
need to move to a state that has its arms wide 
open for illegal aliens.2 
 
Alabama’s H.B. 56 is part of a legislative strategy known 
as “self-deportation”-a term first used to satirize an early 
ancestor of H.B. 56 that was passed in California as a public 
referendum titled, Proposition 187.3 The satirical term 
transformed into public policy for states that were frustrated 
by a perceived lack of federal enforcement of immigration laws. 
The policy got national attention when Mitt Romney adopted 
self-deportation as part of his platform during the 2012 
Presidential election campaign.4 Despite a national discussion 
on immigration generally, often self-deportation legislation 
remains a local or state based issue. In June of 2013, the town 
of Fremont, Nebraska successfully defended in the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals a set of ordinances written to prevent 
undocumented immigrants from living in the city.5 
Self-deportation legislation varies as to its provisions and 
enforcement, but the central idea remains the same: control 
and prevent migration of undocumented people6 into a state or 
locality with discriminating treatment. Whether it is the City 
of Hazleton, Pennsylvania outlawing the undocumented from 
 
2. This American Life: Reap What You Sow, CHICAGO PUBLIC RADIO (Jan. 
27, 2012), http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-
archives/episode/456/transcript. 
3. See Robert Mackey, The Deep Comic Roots of ‘Self-Deportation,’ N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2012, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/01/the-deep-
comic-roots-of-self-deportation. 
4. Julia Preston, Republican Immigration Platform Adopts ‘Self-
Deportation,’ N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2012, 
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/23/republican-immigration-
platform-backs-self-deportation. 
5. Keller v. City of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2013). 
6. This article will use the term “undocumented person” or 
“undocumented migrant” to refer to those who have either entered into the 
United States without inspection, or have continued to stay in the United 
States after violating their immigration status.  For the same reasons 
articulated by the AP and other news organizations, the use of the term 
“illegal immigrant” will not be employed.  See Paul Colford, ‘Illegal  
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renting apartments, H.B. 56’s declaration that all contracts 
entered into with undocumented people are unenforceable, or 
Arizona’s prohibition on transportation of undocumented 
people, the goal is to prevent the physical presence and 
residence of any undocumented person within city or state 
borders.7 The term “self-deportation” is not limited to the 
removal of unwanted migrants currently residing in the state 
or municipality, but also refers to the creation of a hostile 
environment for undocumented migrants so as to deter them 
from migrating into the state or municipality at all.8 
In June of 2012, the Supreme Court struck a severe blow 
against self-deportation laws when it ruled that existing 
federal law pre-empted three out of the four provisions of 
Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and that the fourth provision would survive 
only if narrowly applied.9 In deciding the case, the Court never 
directly addressed Arizona’s purpose in passing the law, which 
was to expel the undocumented. Rather, the Supreme Court 
sidestepped questions about whether the law was 
discriminatory, unduly harsh, or violated a substantive 
constitutional right of a person or a group of people.10 Despite 
S.B. 1070’s overt discrimination and harsh treatment of a class 
of people, the Court’s opinion only referred to sovereignties and 
the balance of power between the federal and state 
governments. 
Pre-emption’s role in the S.B. 1070 litigation is 
 
7. Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance (“IIRAO”), Alabama Act 
2011-535, and SB 1070 §5. 
8. The architects of such policy viewed an enforcement heavy 
environment essential to not only expel unwanted migrants but to also serve 
as a deterrent for their migration.  See Jessica M. Vaughan, Attrition 
Through Enforcement: A Cost-Effective Strategy to Shrink the Illegal 
Population, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUDIES (Apr. 2006), available at 
http://www.cis.org/Enforcement-IllegalPopulation. 
9. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012) (“Arizona 
may have understandable frustrations with the problems caused by illegal 
immigration while that process continues, but the State may not pursue 
policies that undermine federal law.”). 
10. See Justin Feldman, The Missing Racial Profiling Argument in the 
Arizona Case, COUNTERPUNCH (July 19, 2012), 
http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/07/19/the-missing-racial-profiling-
argument-in-the-arizona-case (The one provision of S.B. 1070 that 
presumably survived would have been analyzed under the Fourth 
Amendment, but the Court found the charge untimely.). 
3
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unsurprising as it has been used to challenge state based 
immigration regulation for more than a century.11 Even though 
self-deportation legislation is often explicitly discriminatory 
against a group of people, a focus on structural and federalism 
values was used as the constitutional footing of the 
undocumented continues to be unclear and their access to 
constitutional protections limited. Surrogates such as 
federalism, administrative competence and, in some cases, the 
substantive rights of citizens in order to challenge state based 
immigration laws has in the modern era proved to be more 
effective than using traditional civil rights bulwarks such as 
Equal Protection.12 
The shift from a focus on discrimination and substantive 
rights to ones focusing on pre-emption and surrogates, raises 
certain concerns. Professor Geoffrey Heeren warns that the 
repeated use of procedural surrogates and structural 
arguments such as pre-emption masks the trend of taking 
away substantive rights for non-citizens and could even 
backfire by allowing litigants to strip away immigrant friendly 
legislation or policy.13 Even as state legislators in Arizona, 
Georgia and Alabama write laws designed to drive the 
undocumented from their respective borders; states such as 
California, Illinois, and New Mexico have passed laws designed 
to welcome the undocumented. Faithful adherence to the pre-
emption doctrine might jeopardize such efforts as 
impermissible attempts to interfere with federal immigration 
policy. More importantly though, an exclusive focus on pre-
emption and surrogates strategies creates the impression that 
the constitutional defect of self-deportation laws is not with the 
discrimination or the draconian treatment of people inherent in 
these policies, but rather that they are administrated by the 
wrong officials. Two of the more objectionable aspects of self-
deportation law, classification of a group of vulnerable people, 
 
11. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875). 
12. See Charles L. Black Jr. , Structure and Relationship in 
Constitutional Law 39-51 (1969), Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution 
of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional 
Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992). 
13. See Geoffrey Heeren, Persons Who are Not the People: The Changing 
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and harsh treatment of those people designed to drive them out 
of their homes, remain unaddressed. However, because the 
undocumented remain legally vulnerable to classification 
generally,14 and harsh treatment can implicate a spectrum of 
traditional state police powers, finding a constitutional defect 
that addresses the discrimination and draconian treatment is 
elusive. A critical look at Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in 
Arizona reveals a potential source of substantive protection 
against state discrimination of the undocumented that 
addresses both discrimination and the harsh treatment; the 
right to travel. 
 During oral arguments of Arizona v. United States, 
Justice Scalia succinctly stated a defense to Arizona’s power to 
force out undocumented immigrants: “The Constitution 
recognizes that there is such a thing as state borders, and the 
states can police their borders.”15 Justice Scalia’s dissenting 
opinion repeatedly relies on the premise that the state of 
Arizona is a sovereign body.16 Because one key aspect of 
sovereignty is the power to control borders and prevent entry to 
unwanted migrants, Justice Scalia argued that Arizona could 
exercise such a power to exclude undocumented immigrants. 
This justification for controlling migration is not novel or 
without support; the constitutional justification for federal 
power in regulating immigration is based largely on the 
sovereignty of the United States.17 National sovereignty, as the 
source of the constitutional power to restrict migration into the 
United States, rests on the premise that each nation should 
have the ability to define its own membership. Such 
membership is primarily defined by who is allowed to enter, 
 
14. Motomura, Hiroshi, Immigration Outside the Law (Kindle Locations 
2977-2980, 2993) Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition (2014). 
15. Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. 
Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182). 
16. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 516 (1858) (“And the powers of 
the General Government, and of the State, although both exist and are 
exercised within the same territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct 
sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other, within their 
respective spheres.”). 
17. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (“The 
power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to 
the government of the United States as a part of those sovereign powers 
delegated by the Constitution.”). 
5
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reside and become a citizen of the United States. Justice Scalia 
argued that Arizona’s sovereignty should lead to a similar 
result. 
Arizona designed S.B. 1070 to protect its borders and expel 
the undocumented from its territory. Arizona decided that its 
residents should not include the undocumented and used 
several of its police powers to enforce this decision. By 
protecting its borders and choosing its residents, Arizona’s 
actions were that of a mini-nation, or perhaps a “demi-
sovereignty.”18 If Arizona and each of the several states are 
sovereigns, then why shouldn’t their sovereignty allow them to 
decide who is allowed to enter and live within its borders? 
Despite the common usage by jurists and commentators in 
referring to states as “sovereigns,” when each of the several 
states formed the union or joined the national government, 
each state gave up its sovereign right to do exactly what 
Arizona tried to accomplish with S.B. 1070.19 Controlling 
borders and deciding the make-up of one’s populace is certainly 
a sovereign power,20 and yet, the Constitution denies this 
power to state governments by enforcing the right to travel. 
The individual states, unlike the United States, do not 
have the ability to determine their membership and thus 
cannot control their borders in the same manner as the federal 
government. Arizona cannot prevent Alaskans from migrating 
into its territories, or the poor and homeless from choosing to 
reside in the warmth of the Arizona sun. This inability to 
control or restrict migration of people into a state’s territory is 
rooted in the right to travel and is a fundamental feature of our 
Constitution. The right to travel, a foundational aspect of both 
federalism and an instrument against discrimination, is an 
absolute barrier to self-deportation laws passed by states 
trying to evict the undocumented or trying to prevent their 
migration into the state. 
 
18. Peter Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-
Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 121 (1995). 
19. New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 90 (1883) (“The states are 
not nations, either as between themselves or towards foreign nations. They 
are sovereign within their spheres, but their sovereignty stops short of 
nationality. Their political status at home and abroad is that of states in the 
United States.”). 
20. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/7
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The right to travel has a variety of incarnations and many 
different constitutional homes over its history, a history that 
predates the Constitution. Article IV of the Articles of 
Confederation expressly forbade States from restricting entry 
into the individual states.21 After the ratification of the 
Constitution, the Supreme Court, even as it struggled to 
pinpoint its textual foundations, regularly struck down state 
laws that discouraged migration or travel. The Court in various 
periods anchored this right to Article IV’s Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution,22 the 
Dormant Commerce Clause,23 the Substantive Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,24 as a 
fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause,25 and most recently, in the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.26 Despite 
murky explanations and confusing applications, the right to 
travel’s function as an invaluable tool in preserving the mobile 
and dynamic nature of the nation has never been in doubt. 
Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and Alabama’s H.B. 56 represent the 
latest in a long line of attempts by states trying to prevent 
certain people from living within their borders. In the past, 
States have attempted to prevent the poor from moving into 
their territories by criminalizing their transportation or 
denying welfare benefits.27 At other times, states have tried to 
discourage migration by taxing travelers or denying new 
residents the right to vote or access to free non-emergency 
care.28 Whether a state takes direct efforts to deny entry to 
travelers or tries more indirect measures, such as increasing 
taxes or denying benefits, to drive out new residents (travelers 
or migrants), the Court has declared that an effort to exclude or 
 
21. Articles of Confederation Article IV. 
22. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (7 Wall.) 168 (1869). Ward v. Maryland, 79 
U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870). 
23. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1942). 
24. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958). 
25. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969). 
26. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
27. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1942); Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969). 
28. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), Memorial Hospital v. 
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). 
7
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expel people, is an unconstitutional abridgment to the right to 
travel.29 Even when a state exercises police powers, such as 
allocating employment benefits, criminalization, or taxation, if 
such power is used to impact migration, the Court has declared 
such actions unconstitutional.30 State self-deportation laws 
should meet a similar fate. 
The current state-based immigration laws are not meant to 
regulate non-citizens within their states and localities, but 
rather to drive them out. These state actions are overt 
attempts to exclude a specific group of people from migrating, 
traveling, or doing any sort of commercial activity within the 
respective borders. If Arizona’s H.B. 1070, Alabama’s H.B. 56, 
or even the Hazelton ordinances had targeted any group that 
consisted of United States citizens, such as indigents, the 
mentally impaired,31 or convicted child molesters, the laws 
would have been struck down as an impermissible violation of 
the right to travel. As the Supreme Court explains, “the 
purpose of inhibiting migration . . . [of] persons into the State is 
constitutionally impermissible.”32 And yet, because the 
particular group of people involved are not citizens of the 
United States and do not have federal authorization to remain 
in the country, this limitation on state power has not been 
seriously considered by federal courts to date. This oversight 
ignores the anti-discrimination purpose right to travel and its 
role in ensuring that membership decisions are left to the 
federal government. 
Part I of this Article discusses the limitation of the pre-
emption doctrine on state self-deportation laws. Part II 
discusses a short history of the Supreme Court’s application of 
the right to travel. Part III explains why the lack of federal 
authorization or immigrant status does not exclude people from 
the right to travel’s protection. Part IV discusses how the right 
to travel relates to citizenship and how the undocumented may 
exercise what has been described as a privilege or immunity of 
citizenship. Finally, Part V examines how the current state-
 
29. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 
30. See Attorney Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986). 
31. Bethesda Lutheran Home & Servs., Inc. v. Leean, 122 F.3d 443 (7th 
Cir. 1997). 
32. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/7
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based “self-deportation” immigration laws violate the right to 
travel. 
 
I. The Limitations of Pre-emption 
 
The Arizona Court relied on pre-emption in striking down 
many of SB 1070’s provisions. Pre-emption as a doctrine 
involves examining whether state law unconstitutionally 
interferes or conflicts with federal law. In traditional pre-
emption analysis, state laws can be pre-empted in either an 
express manner or in an implied manner.33 Express pre-
emption usually would have congressional language that 
clearly indicates that state laws are not tolerated. For implied 
pre-emption, it can exist in one of two ways; conflict pre-
emption where state laws conflict directly with federal law or 
goals, and field pre-emption, where federal law is so 
comprehensive in an area that no space is left for the state.34 
The Arizona Court employed a variety of different pre-
emption analysis on each provision of SB 1070 separately.35 For 
certain provisions, such as the Arizona registration provision, 
the Court found “that the Federal Government has occupied 
the field of alien registration.”36 With other provisions the 
Court employed an implied conflict pre-emption analysis. One 
of the key rulings from Arizona was that State laws that 
encroached on the use of federal enforcement discretion would 
be pre-empted.37 The Court also struck down one of the main 
strategies that architects of self-deportation laws had tried to 
use; the mirror-theory.38 What was largely left untouched by 
 
33. NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, 2 SUTHERLAND 
STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 36:9 (7th ed. 2009). 
34. Id. Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2501. 
35. Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2501-10. See also, Jennifer M. Chacón, The 
Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 WM & MARY BILL RTS. J. 577 
(2012). 
36. Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2501. 
37. Id. at 2506. 
38. Id. at 2502-03.  For a detailed discussion of the history of the “mirror 
theory”, please see Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality 
of State Regulation of Immigration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 
251, 253-54 (2011). And Kris W. Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of Law: What 
States Can and Should Do to Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. 
9
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the Arizona decision, and which continues to be a source of 
conflict, is when states regulate in areas that do not have 
federal analogues. Federal law does not regulate non-citizen 
housing, or their economic and social activity in the manner 
that some self-deportation laws, such as HB 56, or the 
municipalities of Hazelton, City of Freemont and Farmers 
Branch attempted to do. Without any federal analogues, these 
laws cannot be analyzed under an implied conflict analysis and 
instead must be analyzed using “field” preemption principles. 
The problem with using field pre-emption analysis comes with 
how to frame what “field” the state law is trying to regulate. 
 
A. A Difference in Framing: When do States and Cities 
Engage in Immigration Policy? 
 
One of the most difficult aspects of immigration pre-
emption law has been deciding when a state law should be 
considered an “alienage” law or an “immigration” law.39 State 
laws that consider alienage has existed and upheld from nearly 
the beginning of the nation’s history.40 At the same time as 
Professor Motomura has written, ““Alienage” rules may be 
surrogates for “immigration” rules. Often, the intended and/or 
actual effect of an alienage rule is to affect immigration 
patterns.”41 At what point can a state law that regulates non-
citizens, becomes an “immigration law” that should be 
preempted? Prior to the Arizona court, the answer was 
confusing, and after Arizona, the answer continues to be 
confusing, especially for state laws42 that regulate in an area 
 
L.J. 459, 475 (2008) (“[s]tate governments possess the authority to 
criminalize particular conduct concerning illegal immigration, provided that 
they do so in a way that mirrors the terms of federal law.”) 
39. Motomura, Hiroshi, Immigration and Alienage Federalism and 
Proposition 187, 35 Va. J. Int’l L. 201, 202 (1994). (“As traditionally 
understood, "immigration law" concerns the admission and expulsion of 
aliens, and "alienage law" embraces other matters relating to their legal 
status.”) 
40. L. Bosniak, Membership, Equality and the Difference That Alienage 
Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1047, 1087 (1994) 
41. Motomura, 35 Va. J. Intl. L. at 202. 
42. For the purposes of this paper, “state laws” refers to not just laws 
passed by the State legislature or Assembly, but also includes city ordinances 
and public referendums as they are considered to be wielding power granted 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/7
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that federal laws do not. 
Three separate circuit courts after the Arizona decision 
had a chance to examine rental restrictions aimed at the 
undocumented, and one court, the Eleventh Circuit decided on 
the contracts provision of HB 56 passed by Alabama. How the 
circuit courts decided the fate of these two provisions plays an 
important role in understanding the potential limitation of pre-
emption. 
In 2006 and 2007 Hazelton Pennsylvania passed an 
ordinance titled, “Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance” 
and a rental registration ordinance. In 2010, the Third Circuit 
ruled such ordinances were pre-empted by federal law, 
however, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the 
Third Circuit and subsequently decided the fate of Arizona’s 
SB1070.43 The Hazelton ordinance essentially made all leases 
entered into with the undocumented “void.” Originally, in the 
decision prior to remand, the Third Circuit decided that such 
restrictions were field pre-empted and post remand the Third 
Circuit found no reason to revisit this decision. The court 
decided that the “field” at issue was the immigration policy 
generally. Because Hazelton or the State of Pennsylvania could 
not make immigration determinations on their own, any laws 
that attempted to occupy such a field would be found to be pre-
empted. The court connected rental restrictions with a form of 
regulating residency in the United States. The court 
summarized its position thusly, “[t]he housing provisions of 
Hazleton’s ordinances are nothing more than a thinly veiled 
attempt to regulate residency under the guise of a regulation of 
rental housing. By barring aliens lacking lawful immigration 
status from rental housing in Hazleton, the housing provisions 
go to the core of an alien’s residency. States and localities have 
no power to regulate residency based on immigration status.”44 
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Farmers Branch examined a 
similar rental restriction and noted, “[t]his is because no alien 
with an unlawful status will be able to obtain the basic need of 
 
by the State. See generally, Olivas, Michael, Immigration-Related State and 
Local Ordinances: Preemption, Prejudice, and the Proper Role for 
Enforcement, 2007 U Chi Legal F. 27 (2007). 
43. Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013). 
44. Id.at 315. 
11
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shelter through a rental contract. Illegal aliens will therefore 
have no recourse but to self-deport from Farmers Branch.” In 
order to find this result unconstitutional, Judge Reavley in his 
concurrence went on to explain that “forced migration of illegal 
aliens conflicts with the careful scheme created by the INA and 
burdens the national prerogative to decide which aliens may 
live in this country and which illegal aliens should be 
removed.”45 The Eleventh Circuit in Alabama v. United States 
used the same logic and reasoning.46 Under pre-emption 
analysis the courts needed to make the connection that 
expulsion from a city or state is in practice an attempt to expel 
a person from the United States entirely. 
The Eighth Circuit unlike the en banc Fifth Circuit or the 
Third Circuit upheld the city of Freemont’s rental restrictions. 
The Eighth Circuit did not quarrel with the Third Circuit’s 
analysis of the effect of the rental restriction in discouraging 
migration out of the municipality, but instead disagreed as to 
whether it occupied the field of immigration regulation. “Laws 
designed to deter, or even prohibit, unlawfully present aliens 
from residing within a particular locality are not tantamount to 
immigration laws establishing who may enter or remain in the 
country.”47 It is on this basis that the Eighth Circuit upheld the 
rental restrictions as not field pre-empted and later on using 
similar justification found it free from conflict pre-emption as 
well. 
The disagreements between the Eighth circuit and the 
Third and Fifth Circuit can be traced back to one of the 
Supreme Court’s first pre-emption decision in Chy Lung.48 In 
Chy Lung, California set high bond amounts for certain 
Chinese woman attempting to de-board ships that landed in 
California.49 The Court ruled such policies interfered with 
federal treaty power and the ability to control immigration.50 
 
45. Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524 (concurring opinion by Judge 
Reavley.). 
46. It is also clear to us that the expulsion power Alabama seeks to 
exercise through [the contract provision] conflicts with Congress's 
comprehensive statutory framework governing alien removal. 
47. Keller, 719 F.3d at 941 (8th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original) 
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Because the migrants were not just entering the state of 
California, but at the same time was entering in the United 
States, the state policy’s interference with federal immigration 
policy was direct and obvious.51 And yet, when states in the 
interior, such as Nebraska or Pennsylvania, impose barriers for 
the undocumented the effect on immigration becomes more 
indirect as these migrants have already entered into the 
United States. 
At this point, an Equal Protection case steps in and does 
the heavy lifting for circuits that struck down the rental 
restrictions. In Traux v. Rauch, the Court struck down an 
Arizona employment restriction that affected all non-citizens 
including lawful permanent residents.52 The Court examined 
the employment restriction under the equal protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and remarked, “[State authority] 
does not go so far as to make it possible for the State to deny to 
lawful inhabitants, because of their race or nationality, the 
ordinary means of earning a livelihood. It requires no 
argument to show that the right to work for a living in the 
common occupations of the community is of the very essence of 
the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose 
of the Amendment to secure.”53 The language of Traux was 
focused on Equal Protection concerns. But in deciding the 
Equal Protection question, it had to decide Arizona’s interest in 
passing the employment restriction. The Court ruled that 
whatever interest Arizona may have, it cannot include 
preventing employment of lawful permanent residents. 
Denying employment to lawful permanent residents would 
deny them “entrance and abode,” because “instead of enjoying . 
. . their full scope the privileges conferred by the admission, 
[they] would be segregated in such of the States as chose to 
offer hospitality.”54 The Court reasoned that forcing 
immigrants out of Arizona would affect national immigration 
policy because other states might follow suit.55 All of the 
 
51. Id. 
52. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). 
53. Id. at 41. 
54. Id. at 42. 
55. It is important to note that Traux’s comments about state exclusion 
impacting national immigration, were only used to examine state power or 
13
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circuits that struck down the self-deportation laws following 
Arizona relied on this reasoning from Traux. The Eighth 
Circuit’s response in Fremont was simple, “[w]e are unwilling 
to speculate whether other state and local governments would 
adopt similar measures, whether those measures would survive 
non-preemption challenges, and the impact of any such trend 
on federal immigration policies.”56 
While the logic of Traux seems sound enough on the 
surface, there are flaws on its application to pre-emption 
jurisprudence. The language of how forcing a person out of any 
one state could prevent him or her from living in any state was 
an examination of state interest under Equal Protection. The 
hypothetical that if one state could exclude may lead to other 
states also excluding non-citizens demonstrated the lack of 
state interest in controlling migration, not a direct example of 
preemption. Applying this reasoning to pre-emption 
necessitates that the power to exclude non-citizens from a state 
border conflicts with the power to exclude people from the 
national border because of how that power can be wielded in 
the aggregate. It is this leap that some courts, such as the 
Freemont court found too tenuous and remote to make. Second, 
Traux was also focused on a state curtailing a right given to an 
individual by federal auspices. The lawful permanent resident 
status of the petitioner was key, for the Court relied on the 
notion that he was “admitted with the privilege of entering and 
abiding in the United States, and hence of entering and abiding 
in any State in the Union.” The federal authorization set up the 
conflict with state law as lawful permanent residents were 
explicitly given authorization to not just enter the United 
States, but also, “entering and abiding in any State in the 
Union.”57 A State’s attempt to prevent migration of lawful 
permanent residents would conflict with federal law, precisely 
because federal law authorized a person to travel and live 
anywhere in the United States. Regulating the undocumented 
would not have this worry. 
When Justice Scalia’s dissent defended state efforts to 
protect their own borders as sovereign bodies, the clear 
 
state interest and not a description of immigration pre-emption. 
56. Keller v. Fremont, 719 F.3d 931, 942 (8th Cir. 2013). 
57. Traux at 42. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/7
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implication was that he viewed such efforts not as 
“immigration” law, but rather closer to the spectrum of 
“alienage” law. Absent a state law such as the one in Chy Lung, 
which prevented noncitizens from entering not just California, 
but the United States, its effects on national immigration 
policy remains indirect and in some instances speculative. And 
yet there is no disagreement that such laws affect the 
migration of people into and out of state borders, in fact, that is 
their very purpose. Using preemption analysis to strike down 
state self-deportation laws requires classifying such efforts as 
affecting national migration policy, but using a right to travel 
analysis only requires acknowledging what has been 
universally accepted, that such efforts have a direct impact on 
migration of people into and out of state borders. 
Critiques of preemption used against state regulation has 
met with a variety of critics, from those who wish to expand 
state regulation of immigration,58 to those who worry that 
preemption may leave noncitizens more vulnerable.59 
Defenders of preemption have not only referred to traditional 
federal concerns, but also to values such as equality and 
establishing membership. In 1995, Professor Motomura 
responded to a proposal by Professor Spiro to allow for more 
state regulation by laying out an “equal protection” defense 
based on the decision from Plyler v. Doe. Recognizing that 
normally the federal government has no greater ability to 
violate the equal protection clause, he did articulate a federal 
interest that states did not; creating a national identity. 
Federal classifications, including ones that delineate the 
undocumented, could be justified under a federal project of 
forming a national identity, while states should not be allowed 
to wade into immigration regulation.60 Invoking Michael 
Walzer, he feared that state regulation of immigration would 
lead to a “thousand petty fortresses.” By 2014 Professor 
Motomura gave a more full-throated defense of immigration 
preemption in his book, Immigration Outside the Law, but 
 
58. Spiro, Peter, Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of 
Demi-Sovereignties, 35 Va. J. Int'l L. 121 (1994). 
59. See Heeren¸supra note 13. 
60. Motomura, Hiroshi, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism and 
Proposition 187, 35 Va. J. Int’l L., 201, 203 (1995). 
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equality and national identity remained central. 
In Immigration Outside the Law, Motomura embraced pre-
emption as a strong basis for disallowing state regulation of 
immigrants and immigration. However, equality and the 
national project of deciding membership remained key in his 
analysis. Despite acknowledging that distinctions between 
migrants who are in the country with authorization and those 
without may be constitutionally allowed, the importance of 
equality, and eventual access to equality remained paramount. 
According to Motomura preemption in the immigration context 
is not solely a structural concern dealing with relationships 
between states and the federal government. Instead, when 
applied to immigration law, preemption becomes a prophylactic 
against violations of equality. “More generally, preemption is 
appropriate if an expanded state or local role substantially 
increases the risk of undetected or unremedied constitutional 
violations.”61 In describing the federal power over immigration, 
Professor Motomura again wrote about the project to create 
national identity and membership by declaring that it was the 
federal government’s province to “to decide who belongs and 
who does not.”62 
Whatever one’s opinion may be about immigration 
preemption63 an overlooked doctrine, the right to travel has 
already directly addressed and incorporated the two main 
themes of Professor Motomura’s preemption theory. The right 
to travel protects against discrimination and is one of the 
purest examples of the limitation of state power to control 
identity and community membership. 
 
61. Motomura, Hiroshi (2014-06-02). Immigration Outside the Law 
(Kindle Locations 3037-3038). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition. 
62. Motomura, Hiroshi (2014-06-02). Immigration Outside the Law 
(Kindle Locations 3071-3073). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition. “The 
federal government’s lawsuits against Arizona, Alabama, Utah, and South 
Carolina reflect its concern that these states have threatened the federal 
government’s constitutional role— as it emerged from the Reconstruction 
Amendments following the American Civil War— to decide who belongs and 
who does not.” 
63. There have been several different scholars who view the preemption 
wielded by the Arizona court in different ways, Kerry Abrams in “Plenary 
Preemption.” 99 Virginia Law Review 601 (2013) described the power as one 
protecting the federal “plenary” power which could similarly be considered as 
the power to decide membership and sovereignty. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/7
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II. History and Evolution of the Right To Travel 
 
Throughout our nation’s constitutional history, the right to 
travel has played a crucial role in defining our federalist 
structure. It has promoted national unity by preventing states 
from frustrating federal power and purpose, and at the same 
time has protected individuals from discrimination and 
unequal treatment. At the start, the right to travel prevented 
any direct interference with the free flow of people over state 
borders such as with direct taxation and creating criminal 
liability for travel. But during the civil rights era, the right to 
travel also began to affect not just direct barriers to migration, 
but indirect means such as discrimination and mistreatment of 
classes of people in order to drive them out. The right to travel 
is more than just allowing people, like commerce, to flow from 
state to state. The right, especially after the Civil War, is a 
prohibition against states from exercising membership 
decisions, not just on a national level, which would interfere 
with national immigration policy, but also membership 
decisions for each individual state. While the Citizenship 
clause prevents States from denying membership to those born 
within a state’s borders, the right to travel prevents States 
from erecting barriers to membership from migrants. 
Individual states may be sovereignties in many ways, but their 
key defect, is that they cannot control who can join and who 
must leave their state. 
The right to travel, and specifically the right to interstate 
travel, enjoys a long and well-recognized history in the United 
States predating the Constitution. Article IV of the Articles of 
Confederation describes an early ancestor to the right to travel: 
 
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual 
friendship and intercourse among the people of 
the different States in this Union, the free 
inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, 
vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, 
shall be entitled to all privileges or immunities of 
free citizens in the several States; and the people 
of each State shall have free ingress and regress 
17
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to and from any other State.64 
 
The Articles of Confederation Article IV’s language 
referring to free ingress and regress did not end up in the text 
of the ratified Constitution, but, nevertheless, courts continue 
to recognize the fundamental aspect of the right, and rarely 
question its existence. Despite this nearly universal 
recognition, the Supreme Court has been inarticulate and 
deliberately vague about the right to travel’s origins or 
applications. The Court has described the right to travel as 
part of the “Privileges or Immunities” clause of Article IV of the 
Constitution,65 as concomitant with national citizenship,66 as 
part of the Dormant Commerce Clause,67 as part of a 
fundamental right protected by Equal Protection Clause,68 and 
most recently, as part of the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.69 While a varied and storied 
history is by no means an unusual characteristic of a 
constitutional right, the right to travel is an anomaly mainly 
because, while successive courts have described the right 
differently, none have expressly overruled or attempted to 
disqualify a previous understanding of the right to travel. As 
will soon become apparent, the right enjoys a fractured and 
diverse nature that appears to be an amalgam of several 
different constitutional rights and concerns. A closer 
examination will reveal a powerful and underappreciated 
protection against discrimination and the tool to keep the 




64. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV. 
65. Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1871) (stating that 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects the right of a citizen of one state 
to travel into another state in order to engage in commerce, trade, or 
business); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869) (holding that the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause provides “the right of free ingress into other 
states, and egress from them.”). 
66. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1867). 
67. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1942). 
68. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 654 (1969); Zobel v. Williams, 
457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982). 
69. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 503 (1999). 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/7
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A. The Passenger Cases—The Beginning of a Winding Road 
 
One of the Supreme Court’s first opportunities to recognize 
the right to interstate travel came when Massachusetts and 
New York created different head taxes for passengers on ships 
seeking port in Boston and New York.70 Eight Justices wrote 
eight separate opinions examining two different state statutes, 
one in New York and one in Boston.71 Both statutes placed 
taxes on ship carriers and used the origin of the passengers to 
determine the rate; passengers from certain states and 
countries increased the taxes levied. 
The New York statute72 required taxes to be paid if the 
ship originated in “foreign” ports. Passengers from other states 
were charged twenty-five cents for every month if the ship was 
from Rhode Island, New Jersey or Connecticut, while 
passengers from other states were charged twenty-five cents 
for each voyage. Foreign passengers were charged a dollar and 
fifty cents if they were in the cabin, or a dollar if they were in 
steerage. The Massachusetts statute73 required all “alien” 
 
70. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 283. 
71. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration 
Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993), for a more detailed 
discussion of the case’s impact on immigration law. 
72. N.Y. Rev. Stat. § 7 (1827) 
 
1. From the master of every vessel from a foreign port, for 
himself and each cabin passenger, one dollar and fifty cents; 
for each steerage passenger, mate, sailor, or mariner, one 
dollar. 2. From the master of each coasting-vessel, for each 
person on board, twenty-five cents; but no coasting-vessel 
from the States of New Jersey, Connecticut, and Rhode 
Island shall pay for more than one voyage in each month, 
computing from the first voyage in each year. 
 
73. Mass. Rev. Stat. § 2-3 (1837) 
 
Sec. 1st. When any vessel shall arrive at any port or 
harbour within this State, from any port or place without 
the same, with alien passengers on board, the officer or 
officers whom the mayor and aldermen of the city, or the 
selectmen of the town, where it is proposed to land such 
passengers, are hereby authorized and required to appoint, 
shall go on board such vessels and examine into the 
condition of said passengers.  Sec. 2d. If, on such 
19
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passengers to undergo inspection and, if they were “lunatics,” 
“maimed,” or if the alien would be deemed to be unable to 
maintain themselves, a bond of a thousand dollars had to be 
issued to ensure that the “lunatic or indigent passenger” would 
not become a charge of the city of Boston for ten years.74 
This early attempt by localities to control immigration 
produced eight different opinions including a dissent by Chief 
Justice Taney. The Justices argued over the power of federal 
immigration, taxation and the meaning of Article I Section 8. 
The discussion also touched upon what Justice Scalia worried 
about on April 25, 2012 when he asked about Arizona’s 
sovereignty. Do the States have complete control over their 
borders with the limited exception of allowing federal agents to 
travel into and through the states? 
Justice Maclean considered the migration of free people as 
“commerce” and determined that regulation of such commerce 
would violate the Commerce Clause.75 As to the question of how 
 
examination, there shall be found among said passengers 
any lunatic, idiot, maimed, aged, or infirm person, 
incompetent, in the opinion of the officer so examining, to 
maintain themselves, or who have been paupers in any 
other country, no such alien passenger shall be permitted to 
land until the master, owner, consignee, or agent of such 
vessel shall have given to such city or town a bond in the 
sum of one thousand dollars, with good and sufficient 
security, that no such lunatic or indigent passenger shall 
become a city, town, or State charge within ten years from 
the date of said bond.  Sec. 3d. No alien passenger, other 
than those spoken of in the preceding section, shall be 
permitted to land until the master, owner, consignee, or 
agent of such vessel shall pay to the regularly appointed 
boarding officer the sum of two dollars for each passenger so 
landing; and the money so collected shall be paid into the 
treasury of the city or town, to be appropriated as the city or 
town may direct for the support of foreign paupers. 
 
74. Such a bond being a very early ancestor to the affidavits of support 
being required for immigrant arrivals in the United States currently, though 
it is difficult to imagine a $1000 bond be payable by most people during that 
time period. 
75. See Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (1 How.) at 405 (“In a commercial 
sense, no just distinction can be made, as regards the law in question, 
between the transportation of merchandise and passengers. For the 
transportation of both the ship-owner realizes a profit, and each is the subject 
of a commercial regulation by Congress. When the merchandise is taken from 
the ship, and becomes mingled with the property of the people of the State, 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/7
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to treat foreigners, Justice Maclean wrote “[e]xcept to guard its 
citizens against diseases and paupers, the municipal power of a 
State cannot prohibit the introduction of foreigners brought to 
this country under the authority of Congress.”76 Justice 
Maclean goes on to explain, “If this power to tax passengers 
from a foreign country belongs to a State, a tax, on the same 
principle, may be imposed on all persons coming into or passing 
through it from any other State of the Union.”77 Justice Wayne 
agreed with his colleague on the application of the Commerce 
Clause and then wrote about the interplay of federal and state 
powers when it came to foreigners. Justice Wayne wrote: 
 
Having surrendered to the United States the 
sovereign police power over commerce, to be 
exercised by Congress or the treaty-making 
power, it is necessarily a part of the power of the 
United States to determine who shall come to 
and reside in the United States for the purposes 
of trade, independently of every other condition 
of admittance which the States may attempt to 
impose upon such persons.78 
 
Justices Maclean and Wayne created the framework, called the 
immigration pre-emption doctrine, for what would later be the 
basis of the Arizona v. United States ruling some 150 years 
later. 
Justice Taney, in his dissent, put forward what would later 
become the right to travel. He began the opinion with a heated 
discussion of how the power to compel entry of foreigners into a 
state’s jurisdictional territory must be considered part of the 
state’s police power to expel unwanted persons that are deemed 
to be a danger. Justice Taney wrote: 
 
 
like other property, it is subject to the local law; but until this shall take 
place, the merchandise is an import, and is not subject to the taxing power of 
the State, and the same rule applies to passengers. When they leave the ship, 
and mingle with the citizens of the State, they become subject to its laws.”). 
76. Id. at 406. 
77. Id. at 407. 
78. Id. at 425-26. 
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States have a right to remove from among their 
people, and to prevent from entering the State, 
any person, or class or description of persons, 
whom it may deem dangerous or injurious to the 
interests and welfare of its citizens; and that the 
State has the exclusive right to determine, in its 
sound discretion, whether the danger does or 
does not exist, free from the control of the 
general government.79 
 
The language referred to “people” and Justice Taney’s concern 
for the ability to protect the state’s own welfare would 
naturally apply not only to foreigners, but anyone entering a 
State’s borders. However, Justice Taney clarified that the 
State’s interest in controlling its borders stopped short of 
citizens and his explanation gave rise to the constitutional 
doctrine of the right to travel. 
According to Justice Taney, a state’s power to expel is 
limited to foreigners. “We are all citizens of the United States; 
and, as members of the same community, must have the right 
to pass and repass through every part of it without 
interruption, as freely as in our own States.”80 The very act of 
creating a Union required free access through the different 
parts of that Union. Unlike Justice Maclean, Justice Taney 
ignored the Commerce Clause, or any text from the 
Constitution in making his declaration. Rather, Justice Taney 
pointed out that the right to travel, including the ingress and 
egress through state territories, is necessary for the federal 
government to function as required by the Constitution. 
 
B. The Right to Travel Emerges as both an Intergovernmental 
Right and as a Personal Right 
 
While the Passenger Cases set the stage, it was Nevada’s 
attempt to tax people leaving its state that brought the right to 
 
79. Id. at 467. 
80. Id. at 492.  It should be noted that Taney’s vision of a national form 
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travel to the forefront and allowed it to emerge as an 
independently recognized fundamental right under the 
Constitution. Two years after the Civil War, the Supreme 
Court struck down a tax levied by Nevada on all outbound 
passengers from the state.81 The Court dispensed with the two 
provisions that swayed the Passenger Cases Court, deciding 
that Nevada’s tax did not affect interstate commerce nor 
imposed a “non-universal” duty. Instead, the Court ruled that 
Nevada’s tax threatened the federal government’s 
constitutional role, including the ability to declare war which 
necessarily also includes being able to raise an army and 
transport troops over state lines.82 The reference to federal war 
powers is unsurprising given how close in time this case was to 
the Civil War, a point Justice Miller drove home by noting that 
if Tennessee or other States during the rebellion had imposed 
similar taxes as those imposed by Nevada, the United States 
could not have paid, and thus may have imperiled the war 
effort. 
Interference with federal power was reason enough to 
strike down Nevada’s tax, but the Court went on to rule that 
the tax infringed on an individual civil right as well. For the 
Crandall Court, the right to interstate travel protects not just 
federal power, but also protects an individual’s ability to 
transact with the federal government, which in turn is 
necessary to protect against state intrusions on a host of 
constitutional rights.83 States that burden travel or prevent 
movement through their territories interfere not just with the 
flow of federal power, but prevent people from seeking the 
protection of the federal government. Given its historical 
 
81. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867). 
82. Id. at 44 (“If this right is dependent in any sense, however limited, 
upon the pleasure of a State, the government itself may be overthrown by an 
obstruction to its exercise.”). 
83. See id, (“[T]he citizen also has correlative rights. He has the right to 
come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon that 
government, or to transact any business he may have with it. To seek its 
protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its functions. He 
has a right to free access to its sea-ports, through which all the operations of 
foreign trade and commerce are conducted, to the sub-treasuries, the land 
offices, the revenue offices, and the courts of justice in the several States, and 
this right is in its nature independent of the will of any State over whose soil 
he must pass in the exercise of it.”). 
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perspective, the Crandall Court’s focus on the federal 
government and its powers is not surprising, nevertheless it is 
important to remember that the decision predated the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which would itself become a primary 
limitation on state power.84 
 
C. The Muddled Mess of Right to Travel—An Incident to State 
Citizenship? 
 
Despite the references to federal power and the Commerce 
Clause in the Crandall court’s language, a distinctly separate 
line of cases created an entirely different basis for the right to 
travel using a historical connection to Article IV of the Articles 
of Confederation. In 1917, Arizona was the site of an infamous 
labor conflict aptly titled the “Bisbee Deportations.” Executives 
of a coal mining company heard of a planned strike by miners 
and were rebuffed by their efforts to get federal authorities to 
quell dissent and a conspiracy was hatched. Henry Wheeler, 
the Sherriff of Cochise County deputized several men from the 
town and began rounding up IWW union supporters. The 
Sheriff and his deputies began to forcibly remove the workers, 
not only from the town, but also transported them on a freight 
train to New Mexico and threatened their lives if they were to 
return.85 The deportees were 1186 men, with over 400 of them 
foreign born. This attempt at strike-busting would later involve 
the Governor of New Mexico and federal authorities. 
Eventually, the Sheriff and coal company executives were 
indicted in federal court on four counts, with the charges all 
variations of the first count: 
 
[Conspiring] to injure, oppress, threaten, or 
intimidate 221 named persons, alleged to be 
citizens of the United States residing in Arizona, 
 
84. The case was decided in March of 1868, while the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified in July of 1868. 
85. Report on the Bisbee Deportations. Made by the President's Mediation 
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of rights or privileges secured to them by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States; that is 
to say, the right and privilege pertaining to 
citizens of said state peacefully to reside and 
remain therein and to be immune from unlawful 
deportation from that state to another.86 
 
The indictments were dismissed on a finding that no federal 
authority existed to prosecute the men for these crimes87 and 
the Supreme Court upheld that decision by the District court. 
The eight Justice majority decision acknowledged that the 
miners’ constitutional rights were violated and went so far as 
describing the violated right to travel as “fundamental” and 
one which encompassed the ability to “peacefully to dwell 
within the limits of their respective states, to move at will from 
place to place therein, and to have free ingress thereto and 
egress therefrom.”88 However, the fundamental nature of the 
right was not enough to sustain the indictment as the Court 
decided that its Article IV origins limited the federal 
government’s enforcement power. 
The right to travel as a subset of the privileges and 
immunities contained in Article IV of the Constitution was not 
a novel position, even if it was primarily dicta. The Wheeler 
Court relied on a pair of cases decided right after Crandall to 
declare the right to travel as a privilege and immunity of state 
citizenship and thus should be enforced primarily by the 
several states.89 The two cases, Paul v. Virginia,90 and Ward v. 
Maryland91 dealt with discrimination against out of state 
commercial agents (one an insurance corporation, and the 
other traders), the Court compared Article IV of the Articles of 
Confederation with Article IV of the Constitution and noted 
that the “free ingress and egress” appeared in the Articles of 
 
86. United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 292 (1920). 
87. The federal kidnapping statute did not exist at this time and would 
not until after the infamous Lindbergh kidnapping. 
88. Wheeler, 254 U.S. at 293. 
89. Id. at 295. 
90. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (7 Wall.) 168 (1868). 
91. Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870). 
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Confederation but was absent from the Constitution.92 The 
Court viewed the deliberate redaction of the “free ingress and 
egress” language as a form of editorial shortcut rather than a 
deliberate choice by the Constitution’s drafters and therefore 
read the right back into the privileges and immunities for the 
Constitution.93 The Court made the extraordinary step of re-
inserting the language because it viewed the right to free travel 
was essential to the privileges and immunities clause, which 
was not expressly enumerated anywhere in the text of the 
Constitution. 
Ward and Paul did not deal with direct obstruction of the 
right to travel; nobody was prevented from entering Virginia or 
Maryland, no taxes were imposed on travelers as in Crandall 
and there was no forcible transportation across state lines as 
with Wheeler. The complainant in Paul was an out-of state 
corporation that objected to higher incorporation fees, while in 
Ward, traders objected to a higher tax levied on them compared 
to resident businesses. The Court recognized the core 
complaint as discrimination94 but waxed eloquently on the 
right to travel as the means to strike down the state laws. 
These began the Court’s recognition that discriminating 
treatment, as much as direct barriers, can affect the flow of 
migration. 
Categorizing the right to travel as a privilege and 
immunity of state citizenship protected by Article IV did not sit 
comfortably for many jurists. By the 1940s, Justices began to 
object to the placement of the right as an incident to state 
citizenship. In Edwards v. California,95 California criminalized 
the transportation of an indigent into the state. A majority of 
the Supreme Court relied on one of the justifications used by 
 
92. See Paul, 75 U.S. at 180 (“gives [citizens of other States] the right of 
free ingress into other States, and egress from them; it insures to them in 
other States the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the 
acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness; and it 
secures to them in other States the equal protection of their laws.”); See also, 
Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1856) (discussing the relationship with the 
Articles of Confederation.). 
93. The Supreme Court was heavily influenced by the landmark decision 
by Judge Washington in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D.Pa. 1823) 
(no. 3,230). 
94. Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 431 (1870). 
95. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1942). 
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/7
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the Passenger Cases court and ruled that the California statute 
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause, rather than Article 
IV. However, several concurring Justices were uncomfortable 
with this justification as it reduced migration into a 
commercial activity and instead articulated a different basis to 
strike down the California law. The Dormant Commerce 
Clause, which prevents bias in favor of in-state commerce, 
seemed a strange place to prevent discrimination against the 
poor. 
Two concurring opinions, one by Justice Douglas and one 
by Justice Black both cited the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment as the source of the right to 
travel and declare it a right of “national citizenship.” Justice 
Douglas rejected prior case law describing Article IV as the 
home to the right to travel by pointing out that the Crandall 
decision could not have meant Article IV, since Nevada taxed 
its own citizens as well as any other traveler. Justice Douglas 
wrote that the right to travel “rises to a higher constitutional 
dignity than that afforded by state citizenship.” For Douglas, 
the right to travel should be an incident to national citizenship 
found in the Fourteenth Amendment rather than Article IV’s 
state Citizenship Clause. While Justice Douglas opinion was 
just a concurrence, the Court would later resurrect it some fifty 
years later. 
 
D. Fundamental Right under the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment 
 
Fear of the poor did not abate after the Edwards decision, 
and states did not give up on their efforts to exclude them. In 
1969, Pennsylvania and Connecticut, along with the District of 
Columbia, decided that they would try to control the migration 
of the indigent by cutting off welfare benefits to new residents, 
thereby actively discouraging welfare recipients from 
migrating.96 The Supreme Court had to decide whether the 
right to travel not only would prevent a state from directly 
barring “ingress” into the state, but would also prevent the 
state from indirectly discouraging migration and encouraging 
 
96. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
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exodus. 
The Shapiro decision changed the course of the right to 
travel jurisprudence in a couple of important ways. First, 
despite nearly a century of jurisprudence, the Court became 
reticent about the origin or textual foundation for the 
constitutional right to travel.97 Secondly, even as the Court 
shied from textually anchoring the right to travel, it introduced 
the Equal Protection Clause as a means to protect against state 
actions inhibiting the right to travel. 
Unlike Crandall, Edwards, or Wheeler, the states in 
Shapiro were not directly inhibiting people from physically 
entering their states. And unlike Ward or Paul, the difference 
in treatment was directed towards new residents, not out-of-
state visitors. These differences were significant; Article IV 
only protected against disparate treatment of out-of-staters,98 
and while taxing travelers could be seen as affecting commerce, 
refusal to give welfare benefits was not seen as violating the 
interstate commerce clause, especially when a federal statute 
encouraged a one-year residency requirement for aid to 
dependent children. 
By refusing to pin down the textual basis for the right to 
travel, the Court in Shapiro could use the Equal Protection 
Clause to strike down the residency requirements without 
having to argue over the textual limits of the right to travel. 
The Court first declared that the residency requirements were 
creating classifications between “new” and “old” state 
residents. This description would not be enough on its face, as 
this classification did not involve any “suspect” classes such as 
race. However, under Equal Protection jurisprudence, state 
statutes can be forced to endure strict scrutiny not just because 
they use suspect classifications, but also if they infringe on a 
“fundamental” right.99 The Court ruled that not only were the 
 
97. See id. at 630 (“We have no occasion to ascribe the source of this 
right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional provision.”).  The 
Court’s reluctance to pin textual source to the right to travel was presaged in 
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 (1966) (“Although there have been 
recurring differences in emphasis within the Court as to the source of the 
constitutional right of interstate travel, there is no need here to canvass those 
differences further.”). 
98. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869). 
99. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/7
  
842 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:2 
states creating classifications based on time of residency, but 
also that this classification’s purpose was to penalize and chill 
a person from exercising his or her fundamental constitutional 
right to travel.100 By describing the right as fundamental, 
without pinning it to a particular constitutional provision, the 
Court was able to void the state statutes under Equal 
Protection without having to deal with some of the limitations 
that would have been inherent under Article IV (which does 
not apply to a state’s treatment of their own citizens), 
substantive due process, or the Commerce Clause. Not only did 
the use of Equal Protection analysis sidestep these limitations, 
but it fit well into the scheme of preventing discrimination 
against the poor. 
In the years that followed, the Court continued to use this 
type of analysis whenever faced with residential requirements 
for certain programs. The Court struck down the denial of free 
non-emergency medical care for new residents,101 the denial of 
voting rights for new residents,102 the preference for a state to 
hire veterans who entered the armed forces while a resident of 
that state,103 and even the denial of dividend benefits given out 
by a state to newer residents.104 While the Court vacillated on 
how to distinguish valid residency requirements105 from invalid 
residency requirements, one of the keys for the Court was 
whether or not the State classification would impermissibly 
discourage migration of certain people into the state.106 
 
100. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969). “If a law has ‘no 
other purpose…than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by 
penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it (is) patently 
unconstitutional.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 
(1968)). 
101. Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250 (1974). 
102. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
103. Att’y Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986). 
104. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 71-81 (1982). (Justice O’Connor, 
in a concurring opinion, wanted to tie the right to travel back to Article IV of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause.). 
105. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975). 
106. One of the key points of confusion for the Court was when residency 
requirements required “strict scrutiny” or just “rational basis.”  The strict 
scrutiny cases all dealt with situations where the infringement on the right to 
migrate were much higher, where the benefits of residency were such that it 
was more than just affecting the choice to migrate, but had a significant 
impact, such as the denial of key welfare benefits, the ability to get non-
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The years following Shapiro produced a flurry of litigation, 
including deciding how and in what circumstances the right to 
travel could be conditioned.107 Nevertheless, both 
commentators and the Court were uncomfortable with labeling 
the right to travel as “fundamental” and yet refusing to pin 
down a constitutional source, and in Zobel, Justice O’Connor 
explicitly tried to tie the right to travel to the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV.108 
 
E. Privileges or Immunities Clause: The Three Aspects of the 
Right to Interstate Travel 
 
In 1992, California’s decision to change their welfare 
benefits program gave the Supreme Court a chance to clarify 
the muddled jurisprudence of the right to interstate travel and 
lay out some concrete guidance to states on when the right to 
travel may be implicated. Saenz v. Roe109 appeared at first to be 
a rehash of Shapiro: California required its new residents to 
have a full year of residency before allowing them full access to 
California’s welfare program. There were two essential 
differences from the Shapiro case. First, California did not 
deny new residents all benefits; instead California explicitly 
gave new residents the same benefits they would have gotten 
from the State of their prior residence. Secondly, the federal 
government explicitly authorized durational residency 
requirements for welfare benefits in a separate piece of 
legislation. 
 
emergency health care versus the ability to get divorces, or in-state college 
tuition.   
107. In 1981 the Court had to decide whether a person convicted of child 
abandonment could be restricted from leaving the state of Georgia by 
prosecution as a felon.  See Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412 (1981).  The Court 
recognized that the right to interstate travel was undisputedly part of the 
federal Constitution and yet recognized the varying theories and historical 
confusion as to the exact source of the right.  Without resolving the confusion, 
Justice Stevens explained that, despite the fundamental nature of the right 
to travel, restrictions to the right to travel have always been recognized in 
certain circumstances, especially in the context of crimes.  A more detailed 
discussion appears in Section 2, infra. 
108. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 71-81 (1982) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
109. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
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The first difference—treating new residents to California 
in the same manner as they would have been in their original 
state—was a crucial distinguishing factor from Shapiro. While 
the Court in Shapiro and Maricopa County forbade 
classifications that “punished” people for traveling, California’s 
policy did not impose any burdens on new residents, as they 
would receive the same benefits they had prior to moving. This 
circumstance sidestepped the language from Shapiro and its 
progeny requiring some sort of “burdening”—even though 
California treated new residents differently than established 
residents. 
The second difference, federal authorization, also 
foreclosed another previously relied upon source of the right to 
travel. The Dormant Commerce Clause, the textual source 
relied upon in Edwards, provides no protection in the face of 
federal authorization. While states may not burden interstate 
commerce on their own, any authorization by Congress would 
allow states to affect interstate commerce without violating the 
Dormant Commerce Clause.110And finally, because the 
Privileges and Immunities clause of Article IV is limited to 
protecting only temporary travelers or non-in state residents,111 
the Court was left with a dilemma: either California’s 
classification system was constitutional or the source of the 
right to interstate travel had yet to be discovered. 
Justice Stevens surveyed the long history of the right to 
travel and identified three separate aspects to the right to 
interstate travel. First, any actual barrier to traveling into and 
out of the state would offend the right to travel. Second, 
temporary “out of state” visitors could not be discriminated 
against. Finally, in a move that both adopted and distinguished 
Shapiro, Justice Stevens explained that the right to interstate 
travel includes, “for those travelers who elect to become 
permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens 
 
110. There remains a question as to whether federal authorization 
would render permissible what is otherwise a violation of the Comity Clause. 
See Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 1468 (2007). 
111. Justice O’Connor had consistently argued that there was no 
problem in relying on Article IV protections for new residents; she considered 
“new” residents on the same footing as travelers. 
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of that State.”112 This formulation allowed the Court to avoid 
framing the issue as “punishing” a choice to migrate into the 
State. The very aspect of creating a classification for new 
residents was considered “punishment” enough. The Court 
maintained its mysterious reluctance to identify the source of 
the first aspect of the right to travel, cited Article IV as the 
source of the second aspect, and revisited the oft-criticized 
Slaughter-House Cases to unearth the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause as the source of 
the third aspect of the right to travel. The right to be free from 
discrimination became not just an Equal Protection right, but 
also a Privilege or Immunity of national citizenship.113 This 
pivot away from the Equal Protection Clause allowed the Court 
to identify a “textual” source for the right to travel instead of 
relying on its “fundamental” aspect. By anchoring the right to 
travel, or in this respect, the freedom from discrimination for 
being a “new resident,” to the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Court could ignore federal 
authorization of durational residency requirements and declare 
California’s changes to the welfare system unconstitutional. 
The resurrection of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Privileges or Immunities Clause could have been 
revolutionary,114 and yet Justice Stevens blunted the impact of 
such a ruling by seizing upon dicta from the Slaughter-House 
Cases that referred to waterways,115 and kept most of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause dormant. 
Despite Saenz’s encompassing rhetoric on the history of 
the right to travel, and its outline of the right to interstate 
travel’s three separate aspects, several open questions remain. 
First, the Saenz court explicitly left open the question of the 
textual support for the right of “ingress and egress;” 
tantalizingly, Justice Stevens noted that the right “may simply 
have been ‘conceived from the beginning to be a necessary 
concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created.’”116 
 
112. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500. 
113. Id. at 502. 
114. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Found. Press 
1999). 
115. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (199). 
116. Id. at 501 (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 
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Secondly, the Court never overruled the Shapiro line of cases, 
and while in some respect the jurisprudence seemed to settle 
(Saenz was the last pronouncement by the Supreme Court on 
the right to travel), the right to travel continues to be an 
ongoing source of litigation and confusion with the lower 
courts. Finally, despite describing the right to travel as an anti-
discrimination tool, the Court did not create a workable means 
to identify when disparate treatment would rise to the level of 
“making residents feel unwelcome” such that it would run afoul 
of the freedom to migrate. 
 
F. The Shift from a Federalist Right to Travel into a Civil 
Rights Right to Travel 
 
Prior to the civil rights era, the right to travel had been 
decided primarily on a federalism axis, but the right found new 
life as a tool to protect the indigent and poor when the Court 
decided Shapiro. With Shapiro, the Court leveraged the right 
to travel’s status as a universally accepted constitutional right 
to prevent the discriminatory treatment of the poor but still 
avoided making economic class a protected “suspect” 
classification. The Court was eager to invoke the value of 
equality, but was not prepared to add the poor to the list of 
suspect classification. In order to thread this needle, the Court 
deliberately left the origin and textual support for the right to 
travel vague and indeterminate. The Court had taken what 
was a primarily a structural right and reshaped it into a tool to 
protect individuals from discrimination. Shapiro completed the 
transformation of the right to travel from a federalism right 
into a full-fledged civil rights one. And yet, the transformation 
was uncomfortable. The 1970s and 1980s showcased the 
Supreme Court’s discomfort with describing the right to 
interstate travel as a civil rights issue as the Court took up a 
right to travel case each year from 1970 until 1975.117 The 
1980s were only slightly less fertile for the right to interstate 
 
(1966)). 
117. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Graham v. Richardson, 403 
U.S. 365 (1971); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); San Antonio Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 
415 U.S. 250 (1974); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975). 
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travel, seeing three cases taken up by the Supreme Court.118 
Until the Saenz decision, only two cases in the 1990s dealt in 
part with the right to travel, Bray v. Alexander and Nordlinger 
v. Hahn, and in both cases the Court found that the right to 
travel was not implicated. As the civil rights era faded, so did 
the use of the right to travel. Finding Equal Protection 
inadequate on its own, the Court in Saenz attempted to 
identify the textual source of the right to travel’s personal right 
component. As Laurence Tribe explains, while structural rights 
could remain un-enumerated, rights which belonged to 
individuals must be located in the text of the Constitution, 
which is why the Saenz Court was willing to reach back and 
risk resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment which had laid mostly dead since the 
Slaughter-House Cases.119  
At first glance, Saenz appears to repudiate Shapiro’s equal 
protection analysis, but the Court never overturned Shapiro, 
and the Equal Protection framework for the right to travel 
continues to survive. The lower federal courts continue to rely 
on Equal Protection analysis when deciding right to travel 
cases. For instance, in Doe v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probationers 
& Parole,120 the court explained that under Equal Protection 
analysis laws that use non-suspect classifications can still be 
unconstitutional if they impinge on fundamental rights, with 
the right to interstate travel being one of them.121 The 
Massachusetts Supreme Court interpreted Saenz as 
reaffirming the Shapiro decision and continues to rely on the 
Equal Protection Clause when deciding right to travel cases.122 
 
118. Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412 (1981); Att’y Gen. of New York v. 
Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982). 
119. TRIBE, supra note 114. 
120. Doe v. Pa. Bd. of Probationers & Parole, 513 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 2008). 
121. Despite the fundamental nature of the right, the Court found that 
because the petitioners were under probation, the restriction on the right to 
travel was constitutional.  Id. 
122. Sylvester v. Comm’r of Revenue, 837 N.E.2d 662, 666-67 (Mass. 
2005) (“First, the Court reaffirmed the holding of Shapiro v. Thompson, supra 
(and, by extension, later related decisions), that the constitutional right to 
travel is protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, so that a State classification involving a length of residence to 
qualify for welfare benefits has the effect of imposing a ‘penalty’ on the right 
to travel that is unlawful unless the classification is necessary to advance a 
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This interpretation of Saenz is unsurprising, since the Court 
repeatedly described the right to travel as protecting against 
discriminating treatment. When Justice Stevens equates the 
right to travel as “the right to be treated like other citizens of 
that State” it is not hard to see why courts continue to rely on 
the Equal Protection Clause in deciding right to travel cases. 
The right to travel’s long history showcases its many 
different functions. It helps prevent interstate conflict, both as 
an instrument in Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
and as a form of comity in Article IV’s prohibition against 
discrimination against non-residents. And yet, the right to 
travel is more than just a structural right; it is a fundamental 
right that demands Equal Protection. While its various uses 
and history can be frustrating to commentators and jurists 
alike, the right to travel plays a crucial role in promoting 
national unity and providing a significant bulwark for 
individual freedom. 
 
III. Undocumented Status and the Right to Travel 
 
A. Why Lack of Federal Authorization Does Not Allow States 
to Ignore the Right to Travel for Undocumented Migrants 
 
At first glance, the position that the undocumented can 
claim a right to travel seems preposterous. How could people 
who do not enjoy a legal right to enter or live in the United 
States make a claim as to travel within and between the 
states? An undocumented migrant’s defining characteristic is 
past evasion of immigration procedures or a violation of the 
conditions of his or her entry, so how can he or she claim a 
right to establish residence? But the syllogism is misplaced for 
it assumes that the greater power—to exclude or deport from 
the country which belongs to the federal government—can 
provide states with the so-called lesser power—to exclude or 
deport from an individual state. The difference between state 
and federal sovereignty is a crucial factor in understanding 
how the right to travel extends to those without federal 
authorization. 
 
compelling governmental interest.”). 
35
  
2014] THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL 849 
When the Supreme Court linked the ability to expel 
unwanted migrants to the ability to exclude unwanted people, 
it referred to this power as an “inherent and inalienable right 
of every sovereign and independent nation.”123 The federal 
government’s power to control its borders and the flow of non-
citizens within its territories is an expansive one rarely 
questioned. The federal government may condition entry into 
the United States for several reasons, from restricting 
employment,124 to setting durational limits,125 and even to 
forcing certain geographic limitations on entry.126 This power to 
restrict movement, travel, and migration are all sovereign 
powers because they are all related to the ability to choose 
membership and identity. The United States of America as a 
sovereign nation should have the ability to choose whom to 
accept as members of its society, both temporary and 
permanent. While the most prominent type of membership-
citizenship-is a hotly contested status and will be discussed 
infra, other sorts of membership are no less important. 
Temporary tourists are given a membership into the United 
States to enjoy the sights and provide both culture and 
commerce. Students are given membership into the national 
community of universities and colleges to both learn and 
contribute scholarship. The federal government inspects 
applicants for memberships in the various spheres, and decides 
whether or not a person fits the necessary criteria. 
Undocumented migrants are people who either lost legal 
membership or never applied for such membership from the 
federal government of the United States in the first place. This 
lack of legal recognition is the source of the federal 
government’s power to deport non-citizens, including the 
undocumented. Deportation is the effectuation of the choice by 
the federal government to deny membership to a person inside 
the United States. Whenever the federal government wields 
 
123. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893) (“rest 
upon one foundation, are derived from one source...and are in truth but parts 
of one and the same power”). 
124. Tourist visas do not allow employment, while student visas may 
restrict employment to on-campus positions. 
125. Most non-immigrant visas have durational requirements. 
126. Border Crossing cards are valid for entry for a geographic area 
around the border. 
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this power it must necessarily deny a person a variety of 
substantive due process rights, such as freedom from restraint, 
access to family, and ultimately the freedom to choose one’s 
residence. The power of deportation has a profound 
consequence on what sort of rights an undocumented person 
may assert against the federal government. The federal 
government’s greater power to exclude and therefore deport 
would necessarily subsume a claim to the right to travel. This 
is unsurprising given that, historically, the right to travel is 
mostly unconcerned with the exercise of federal power. The 
right to travel, along with the Citizenship Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,127 is a powerful reminder that the 
individual states have no ability to determine their own 
membership. Without the power to deny individuals state 
membership, States lack the power to expel the unwanted, 
even those without membership granted by the federal 
government-the undocumented migrant. 
 
B. The Right to Travel versus State Sovereignty—the Power to 
Choose Membership 
 
The right to travel jurisprudence began with a focus on 
movement and commerce. The cases recognized that “ingress” 
was to be protected from interference and that commerce would 
suffer if state borders restricted not just goods, but people128 
However, with Shapiro, the focus shifted away from just 
movement to membership and discrimination. Courts no longer 
were concerned with states placing barriers to actual 
movement such as in Wheeler or Edwards, but started to focus 
on how states were choosing which members residing in the 
states would get full protection of the law.129 State 
discriminatory treatment that affected migration garnered the 
attention of the Courts. States were not allowed to deny poor 
 
127. The Citizenship Clause forbids a state from denying state 
citizenship to a U.S. citizen who decides to reside within its territories. 
128. See Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 431 (1870). 
129. This focus on membership questions echoes Professor Motomura’s 
concerns about the national versus state attempts to decide membership.  See 
Section I. The right to travel jurisprudence provides the example  on what is 
an exclusive “national project” the determination of membership that is given 
to the federal government and withheld from the states. 
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migrants full membership status, even though lack of money 
itself was not a protected class. The right to travel evolved into 
a right of migration between states premised on equal 
treatment. 
When the Supreme Court decided Shapiro, it represented 
a leap in the evolution of the right to travel. Prior to Shapiro, 
Courts were focused on making sure that travel and commerce 
were fully protected by denying the individual states the ability 
to restrict movement across their borders. But the law at issue 
in Shapiro was of a wholly different character. California was 
not preventing travelers or businessmen or even federal 
officials from entering or doing business within its borders. 
Rather, California attempted to restrict the number and type of 
persons who could claim membership as California residents 
and, by doing so, receive the full benefits of California laws. 
While the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause made it 
impossible for California to directly deny citizenship in general 
to its residents, California’s disparate treatment of new 
residents tried to accomplish what a direct barrier could not. 
When the Supreme Court struck down the individual 
states’ attempt to discriminate against new migrants who were 
poor, the right to travel became not just about movement or 
travel, but a restriction on how states could use their laws to 
affect their own membership. A State cannot implement its 
own “immigration” policy, precisely because the states are not 
sovereigns. While the direct barriers to movement, such as 
entry taxes and criminalization, would clearly implement a 
migration policy, the Court beginning in Shapiro recognized 
that disparate treatment within the state could accomplish the 
same goals as tightened borders.130 Despite the broad powers 
each state has to police and regulate its members, it may not 
deny membership or withhold the benefits of its laws to people 
who choose to live within its borders. This restriction on state 
power runs parallel to and in contrast with the Federal 
Government power to do exactly what the states cannot. 
Federal immigration policy allows the federal government 
 
130. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).This is the same 
reasoning that motivated the self-deportation architects who decided that 
discriminating against certain people within its borders not only would force 
some out, but would discourage others from entering at all. 
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/7
  
852 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:2 
to deny a myriad of benefits to those it deems unfit. The federal 
government is allowed to enforce its decisions on membership 
through its plenary power and most directly by exercising its 
deportation power. State governments have no such recourse. 
An example of this state disability is borne out by the 
Citizenship Clause, which forbids states from having any say 
on who is and who is not a citizen of the United States. The 
Citizenship Clause not only prevents states from deciding 
federal membership, but-importantly-the clause also prohibits 
states from defining state citizenship when the person in 
question is a natural born citizen. “All persons born or 
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside.”131 While the concept of state citizenship 
played an important role in the Antebellum period, modern 
states tend to use the term “residents” to define a host of state 
membership boundaries precisely because the Fourteenth 
Amendment muddled the meaning of state citizenship.132 
Federalism plays an important role in preserving the role 
of state governments without losing a national character. State 
power is enormously broad and often has the most immediate 
effect on individuals. And yet, the right to travel significantly 
undercuts the sovereignty of individual states. Just as Justice 
Scalia and Justice Taney point out, a state does have 
significant legitimate interests that are severely hampered 
when a state is unable to control its borders and prevent 
migration. When California wanted to limit the poor via the 
legislation in Edwards and in Shapiro, the goal was not just 
prejudice against the poor, but a legitimate concern that an 
influx of the poor would threaten their current welfare system 
for its current citizens. Maricopa County’s decision to limit free 
non-emergency care to established residents was a choice 
designed to protect its program from financial ruin.133 As 
pressing and legitimate the concerns the individual states had, 
the Constitution does not allow the states fix such problems by 
 
131. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
132. Examples include state taxation, in-state tuition, and the 
obligations of jury duty and voting.  The possibility that states can define 
citizenship to those without federal citizenship will be discussed infra. 
133. Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250 (1974). 
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denying residency to people in their particular state. 
 
C. The Right to Travel Protects Interests Unaffected by a Lack 
of Federal Authorization 
 
If states are not allowed to use migration policy as a 
solution to various problems, how does this relate to state self-
deportation laws? There are two main reasons why the lack of 
federal authorization does not affect the right to travel 
analysis. Migration barriers erected by individual states are 
generally repugnant to the comity and relations between the 
different states, and self-deportation laws are no exception. The 
prohibition against states deciding migration policy is an 
important tool to prevent conflicts between the states and to 
promote national unity.134 The status of the migrants being 
protected matters little: the more burdensome or noxious the 
group of migrants is, the more important it is to allow the free 
flow of migration. Just as setting up tariffs or barriers to the 
free flow of goods violates federal unity, so do barriers to the 
free flow of people-including the undocumented—between the 
states. Secondly, the right to travel is a right of personhood and 
not dependent on federal authorization or status. Its 
fundamental nature arose from its concern for equality under 
the law, a protection that extends to the undocumented. 
 
1. The Right to Travel and Comity Considerations 
 
The comity aspect of the right to travel is relatively 
uncontroversial and largely accepted by jurists and 
commentators alike. Professor Nzelibe argues that the right to 
 
134. This potential conflict between states convinces Erin Delaney that 
the Dormant Commerce Clause, one of the potential anchors to the right to 
travel, may be used as a tool to evaluate state self-deportation laws. “In the 
Shadow of Article I: Applying a Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis to State 
Laws Regulating Aliens” 82 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1821 (2007). Much of what she 
describes as concerns under Dormant Commerce Clause, as applied to 
immigration already exists in right to travel analysis. Ultimately, equating 
migration directly with commerce may make the direct application of 
dormant commerce clause jurisprudence problematic.  Regardless, much of 
its application can prove useful in deciding how to detect breaches of the right 
to travel. See infra Part V. 
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travel’s main purpose is “conserving the political and economic 
union against provincial state interests.”135 Professor Nzelibe 
explains that several clauses in the Constitution, namely 
Article IV’s Comity Clause and the Commerce Clause, were 
drafted with the idea of promoting a national Union and 
reducing interstate conflicts. The right to interstate travel 
embodied similar values and should more properly be labeled 
as a “free movement” principle rather than an individually 
protected right. He describes how the free movement principle, 
like Article IV and the Commerce Clause, shared similar 
heritages and policy norms-the promotion of a federal unity.136 
For Professor Nzelibe, the right to travel, Article IV, and the 
Commerce Clause form a trio of “union-conserving norms.”137 
Under the free movement principle, a state’s discriminatory 
practice should be analyzed by deciding if it poses a “threat to 
the underlying norm of promoting federalism” rather than 
examining its effects on individuals.138 The free movement 
principle is a “surrogate” right, which “can be considered those 
interests asserted by the individual against the state to protect 
values that are essential to the existence of one union, as 
opposed to values that presume there are certain liberties 
inherent to the individual upon which the state may not 
infringe.”139 The union-preserving role of the right to travel is 
independent of any specific individual’s status or ability to 
assert rights. The determinative question should be whether 
the state’s interference with movement and migration 






135. Jide Nzelibe, Free Movement: A Federalist Interpretation, 49 AM. U. 
L. REV. 433, 435 (1999). 
136. Other scholars such as Professor Richard Collins, have made 
similar arguments. Professor Collins focused less on the political union but 
rather viewed the Dormant Commerce Clause and the right to travel as 
creating a federal common market. See Richard B. Collins, Economic Union 
as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 43 (1988). 
137. Nzelibe, supra note 135, at 440-41. 
138. Id. at 449. 
139. Id. at 452. 
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2. Self-Deportation Laws as a Threat to Comity Between  
   States 
 
The list of the amici in the S.B. 1070 case before the 
Supreme Court produced few surprises, with one notable 
exception. The States of New York, Illinois, Hawaii, Rhode 
Island, California, Connecticut, Oregon, Massachusetts, 
Maryland and Vermont all joined an amicus brief that argued 
that Arizona’s attempt to initiate a state-based immigration 
scheme under S.B. 1070 violated federalism. While notable that 
these states all argued against their own power to create an 
immigration scheme, most of their arguments echoed the 
federal government’s concerns around pre-emption. However, 
in a section titled “Arizona’s Single-State Removal Policy has 
National and International Effects,” the state attorneys general 
described the impact of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 on their respective 
states.140 
State amici began by describing an effect of S.B. 1070, 
“[b]ecause Arizona cannot compel the federal government to 
remove undocumented residents, S.B. 1070’s provisions have 
the primary effect of redirecting undocumented immigrants to 
other States.”141 Arizona had argued that its undocumented 
population was burdensome, that it led to increases in crime, 
and a threat to the fiscal and employment security of the state. 
Regardless of whether these fears were founded, the goal of 
driving out undocumented immigrants from the state and 
diverting them to their neighbors was exactly what the other 
state amici objected to. But how exactly does Arizona’s decision 
to enact S.B. 1070 affect the other states and would those 
effects lead to unconstitutional conflicts? 
 
a. Migration affecting Interstate Commerce 
 
While this concept may seem repugnant to some, the Court 
has a long history of equating the migration of people with the 
 
140. Brief of the States of New York, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent at 21, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No 11-
182). 
141. See id. 
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flow of commerce, including the migration of non-citizens. 
Many of the Justices in the Passenger Cases rejected the local 
taxes by New York and Boston, believing that they would 
directly implicate interstate commerce and are therefore 
prohibited by the Dormant Commerce Clause.142 The taxes at 
issue in the case were prompted by fears of economic burdens 
and payoffs to other states.143 The commerce justification was 
again relied upon by a concurring opinion of the Court when it 
struck down Nevada’s tax in Crandall, and later once again by 
the majority of the Court in Edwards, which tried to prohibit 
the migration of poor people into the state. While this 
justification fell out of favor later on,144 it has never been 
expressly overruled, and as late as 1982, Justice Brennan 
approvingly noted this justification in the Zobel decision. 
The fact that migration affects commerce does not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that the right to travel is 
housed in the Dormant Commerce Clause, but it does highlight 
the havoc that a violation of the right to travel can have on the 
federal union.145 When states begin to restrict migration of 
people, economic instability follows. The notion that the 
migration of people, whether undocumented or poor, affects 
commerce is not controversial or even debatable. Human 
beings, regardless of their status are principle drivers of 
commerce and the economy. This relationship between 
migration and commerce is one reason that Professor Delaney 
proposed an Article I Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis for 
examining state regulation.146 The magnitude and direction of 
the economic effects of undocumented immigrants has been a 
fiercely debated topic among economists and used by politicians 
as justification to pass laws welcoming or restricting non-
 
142. See Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 283. 
143. Friedrich Kapp, a state Commissioner of Emigration in the 1870s 
wrote, “While New York has to endure nearly all of its evils, the other States 
reap most of the benefits of immigration.” FRIEDRICH KAPP, IMMIGRATION AND 
THE COMMISSIONERS OF EMIGRATION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 157 (The 
Nation Press 1870). 
144. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Saenz v. Roe, 526 
U.S. 489 (1999) 
145. Even if the right to travel is not housed in the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, its analytical framework may be useful in studying immigration 
laws. 
146. Delaney, supra note 134. 
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citizens.147 The laws at issue in the Passenger Cases and Mayor 
of New York v. Miln148 are prime examples of state-based 
immigration restrictions designed to affect interstate 
commerce.149 Similarly, when New York and California 
complained to the United States Supreme Court about 
Arizona’s legislation restricting migration of the 
undocumented, they cited economic concerns. 
 
b. Non-commercial Ways that Migration of Non-Citizens  
    Affects Comity Between States 
 
The effects of controlling interstate migration are not 
limited to commercial repercussions. Arizona, as well as other 
states with similar laws, such as Georgia and Alabama, 
justifies the laws based on non-economic concerns. In its brief 
to the United States Supreme Court, Arizona argued “[t]his 
flood of unlawful cross-border traffic, and the accompanying 
influx of illegal drugs, dangerous criminals and highly 
vulnerable persons, have resulted in massive problems for 
Arizona’s citizens and government, leaving them to bear a 
seriously disproportionate share of the burden of an already 
urgent national problem.”150 The Supreme Court’s majority 
opinion, even as it struck down most of S.B. 1070, recognized 
Arizona’s concerns for law enforcement by citing to a (dubious) 
report that estimated a higher criminal proportionality for the 
undocumented population in Maricopa County.151 
Arizona also expressed concern over the degradation of 
public parks and natural resources caused by border crossers. 
While the magnitude, cause, and perhaps even the existence of 
 
147. See Gordon H. Hanson, The Economics and Policy of Illegal 
Immigration in the United States, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Dec., 2009), 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/economics-and-policy-illegal-
immigration-united-states. 
148. New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837). 
149. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 283; Miln, 36 U.S. at 102. 
150. Brief for the Petitioners at 3, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 
2492 (2012) (No. 11-182). 
151. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012) (citing 
Steven A. Camarota & Jessica Vaughan, Center for Immigration Studies, 
Immigration and Crime: Assessing a Conflicted Situation 16 (2009)). 
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these effects are debatable,152 the stakes are high enough that 
if an individual state appears to try and “pass on” those effects 
to its neighbors, conflicts can arise. Tellingly, Arizona began its 
brief to the Supreme Court by declaring that uneven federal 
enforcement in Texas and California had funneled the burden 
of undocumented immigration to Arizona. 
The stated justifications for SB 1070 in dealing with the 
undocumented have a historical precedent. In Edwards, the 
Court noted “[t]he State asserts that the huge influx of 
[indigent] migrants into California in recent years has resulted 
in problems of health, morals, and especially finance, the 
proportions of which are staggering.”153 As serious as these 
concerns may be, they highlight the degree to which the 
possibility of friction can occur. As the Justices ruled in 
Edwards, “this phenomenon does not admit of diverse 
treatment by the several States. The prohibition against 
transporting indigent non-residents into one State is an open 
invitation to retaliatory measures, and the burdens upon the 
transportation of such persons become cumulative.”154 The 
Court goes on to say, 
 
[a]nd [for limitations on state power] none is 
more certain than the prohibition against 
attempts on the part of any single State to isolate 
itself from difficulties common to all of them by 
restraining the transportation of persons and 
property across its borders. It is frequently the 
case that a State might gain a momentary 
respite from the pressure of events by the simple 
expedient of shutting its gates to the outside 
world.155 
 
The Edwards Court quotes Justice Cardozo as saying “[the 
Constitution] was framed upon the theory that the peoples of 
the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the 
 
152. See Hanson, supra note 112, at 8. 
153. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1942). 
154. See id. at 176. 
155. Id. at 173. 
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long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not 
division.”156 The right to travel plays a crucial role in creating a 
national framework and preventing individual states from 
attempting to fix difficult problems by passing them on to other 
states. 
The passage of S.B. 1070 caused a number of other states, 
including Georgia, Alabama, Indiana, and Utah, to pass similar 
laws. The year that Arizona passed S.B. 1070, several 
newspapers reported that between10 and 20 states were 
considering similar bills.157 While this may, at first, appear to 
be a way for states to unite, especially as many of the laws 
were written by the same authors, this copycat reaction by the 
states is an example of retaliatory action. When the Edwards 
Court described “retaliatory” action, it depicted a scenario 
where other states would react to California’s laws by passing 
similar legislation, only harsher.158 The concern was that each 
state would continually attempt to drive out indigents by 
passing ever more draconian legislation. In passing H.B. 56, a 
law described as broader in scope and harsher in application 
than Arizona’s S.B. 1070 provision, Alabama took the first step 
in creating conflict and chaos among its fellow states. 
 
3. Restriction of Migration of Undocumented Implicates  
   Federal Power 
 
The federalism aspect of the right to travel is not limited to 
“horizontal” federalism, or in other words just comity between 
the states, but does have an impact on vertical federalism, 
namely the relationship between the federal and state 
governments. In Crandall, the Supreme Court explained why 
territorial exclusions by states would and could frustrate 
 
156. Id. at 174. 
157. See John Miller, Twenty Other States Considering Copying Arizona 
Immigration Law, HUFFINGTON POST (June 25, 2010, 7:13 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/25/twenty-other-states-
consi_n_626095.html; ImmigrationWorks USA, Immigration Reform in Other 




158. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160. 176 (1942). 
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national interests and power. The Court described the varying 
seats of federal power, from the centralized to locations far and 
wide within the various states, and explained that 
 
[i]n all these [locations the Federal government] 
demands the services of its citizens, and is 
entitled to bring them to those points from all 
quarters of the nation, and no power can exist in 
a State to obstruct this right that would not 
enable it to defeat the purposes for which the 
government was established.159 
 
Restrictions on movement of people dilute and frustrate the 
Federal government’s ability to exercise its power, especially in 
the realm of immigration and alienage. For example, suppose 
that an undocumented man lives in a state that does not have 
an immigration court, such as Iowa. If he has an immigration 
hearing in Omaha, Nebraska, and Nebraska has strict laws 
criminalizing any entries by the undocumented, then the 
Federal government’s ability to control immigration would be 
threatened by state law. The ability to move between state 
borders not only prevents states from in-fighting, but is also 
necessary to allow federal power to flow throughout the nation. 
Because federal power inheres in its agents and the ability to 
exercise power over people, geographical restrictions on people 
inevitably obstruct that power. 
This type of interference with federal power is not the 
same as pre-emption. Pre-emption, like the right to travel, is 
an outgrowth of the federalist structure. The superiority of 
federal law to state law is an aspect to federalism as much as 
the principle of limited powers for the Federal government. 
Pre-emption is primarily concerned with the vertical structure 
of the government, namely the relationship between a state’s 
power and the Federal government’s. As the Arizona Court 
explained, pre-emption occurs when the Federal government 
has declared exclusive jurisdiction over a field (field pre-
emption), or when state laws and federal laws conflict such 
 
159. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall) at 44. 
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that it becomes impossible to comply with both.160 State and 
local regulation, just like Arizona’s S.B. 1070, can run into pre-
emption issues when dealing with non-citizens. Pre-emption 
and the right to travel, even as purely federalist values, are not 
identical. 
While pre-emption focuses on conflicts between state and 
federal laws, the right to travel’s concerns are broader. The 
right to travel protects federal power in two primary ways. The 
first is to ensure the ability of federal officers and people under 
federal authority to move freely across state borders without 
interference. State immigration laws do not normally interfere 
with federal officers or their ability to freely travel in to and 
out of a state. But interference with federal power also occurs 
when states restrict the ability of people to petition the federal 
government. Self-deportation laws interfere with the ability of 
people to entreat the federal government for benefits and 
protection. When Arizona’s borders are hostile to any 
movement by undocumented people, it is impossible for the 
undocumented to petition the federal government for help or 
protection that they would otherwise have the ability to do.161 
For instance, a young undocumented immigrant, who would be 
otherwise eligible for immigration relief, may be living in 
Arizona or the neighboring state of New Mexico. If Arizona is 
allowed to restrict movement internally or through its borders, 
the applicant may never have a chance to file and attain 
federal relief without violating Arizona laws restricting the 
movement of the undocumented. Even in the modern era, 
which relies heavily on electronic medium, the freedom of 
movement is often necessary for those who seek the authority 
and protection of federal power.162 Any legal restriction on 
movement that may hamper the ability to petition for federal 
protection undermine federal power and is suspect. 
 
 
160. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012). 
161. Crandall’s language does refer to the citizen being able to seek 
federal power, but as will be argued infra, this distinction loses its 
importance once the courts accept that the undocumented have the right of 
access to the court system. 
162. While DACA applications are received through the mail, applicants 
are expected to get biometrics done at application support centers. 
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D. Right to Travel is Not Just a Structural Concern 
 
Describing the right to travel solely in terms of federalism 
misses the right’s rich history and the important role that it 
plays in defending individual liberty. Justice Taney’s 
description defines its purpose as solely structural, and even 
Crandall’s invocation of national interest makes note of the 
“corollary” right possessed by citizens.163 Article IV, commonly 
referred to as the “Comity Clause,” also provides individual 
rights, such as those contained in its Privileges and 
Immunities Clause.164 Despite Professor Nzelibe’s frustration 
with the post-Shapiro line of cases that consistently refer to the 
right to travel as an individual right, other scholars have 
recognized that the right to travel plays a dual role, protecting 
federalism and individual liberty.165 It accomplishes these dual 
purposes by preventing states from discriminating against 
migrants or travelers, directly and indirectly. By prohibiting 
states from engaging in individual migration policies, the right 
to travel enhances the federal union; but it also allows people 
to exercise choice in where to reside or travel within the United 
States. Because the scope and breadth of individual liberties 
can oftentimes vary depending on immigration status, it is a 
fair question to wonder whether non-citizens, especially the 
undocumented, may invoke the right to travel to protect their 
own liberty interests. 
 
E. Equal Protection for the Undocumented 
 
The right to travel was a powerful tool against 
 
163. See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1867) (“But if the 
government has these rights on her own account, the citizen also has 
correlative rights. He has the right to come to the seat of government to 
assert any claim he may have upon that government, or to transact any 
business he may have with it. To seek its protection, to share its offices, to 
engage in administering its functions. He has a right to free access to its sea-
ports, through which all the operations of foreign trade and commerce are 
conducted, to the sub-treasuries, the land offices, the revenue offices, and the 
courts of justice in the several States, and this right is in its nature 
independent of the will of any State over whose soil he must pass in the 
exercise of it.”). 




2014] THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL 863 
discriminatory treatment by the individual states long before 
the creation of the Fourteenth Amendment and its Equal 
Protection Clause. While the right to travel’s protection is not 
as broad in scope of as the Equal Protection Clause, it prevents 
states from using invidious classifications to discourage travel 
or migration. In the Passenger Cases, Massachusetts and New 
York attempted to curtail movement by foreigners and citizens 
who were from out-of-state. The tool they used to accomplish 
this was a head-tax that created various different 
classifications. When California tried to prevent the poor from 
migrating to the state, it passed a criminal law preventing the 
transportation of a certain class of people: those who were 
likely to become indigent. Despite this prior history, it wasn’t 
until Shapiro, that the Equal Protection Clause began to take 
center stage in protecting the right to travel. The right 
certainly existed prior to the Equal Protection Clause, but one 
of the key means to preserve the right—prevention of 
discrimination wasn’t fully realized until the Shapiro decision. 
The right to travel is a fundamental constitutional right such 
that any state classification on its exercise must pass strict 
scrutiny. 
The Supreme Court foreclosed arguments that the 
Fourteenth Amendment as a whole does not apply to the 
undocumented shortly after the Amendment’s ratification. 
Beginning with Yick Wo v. Hopkins,166 non-citizens were able to 
seek protection under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause. Mathews v. Diaz extended the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process protection to include undocumented 
immigrants. 167 However, the Supreme Court did not decide the 
scope of the Equal Protection Clause until Texas passed a law 
that withheld funding to public schools that educated 
undocumented children. 
In Plyler v. Doe,168 the Supreme Court settled several 
questions. First, the words “person” and “within their 
jurisdiction” of the Equal Protection Clause covered 
undocumented immigrants. States may not deny Equal 
Protection of the law to the undocumented. However, while 
 
166. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
167. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). 
168. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1983). 
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Equal Protection covered the undocumented, its application 
remained unclear and ultimately proved to be very narrow.169 
Even as Equal Protection’s scope included the 
undocumented, important limitations were put into place. 
First, the Court decided that undocumented status is not a 
“suspect” class, meaning that strict scrutiny would not apply to 
classifications based on undocumented status. The Court ruled 
that undocumented status was not an immutable characteristic 
and instead was the product of a conscious unlawful act.170 
Second, the Court ruled that public education is not a 
fundamental constitutional right and therefore discriminatory 
restriction on access to public education does not have to 
survive strict scrutiny analysis.171 The second ruling was as 
crucial as the first. If public education is a fundamental right 
under Equal Protection, then even if the classification was not 
suspect, any restriction would still require examination under 
strict scrutiny. Ultimately, the Court ruled the law 
unconstitutional under a lesser form of scrutiny. While Plyler 
importantly opened the door for Equal Protection claims, it did 
so in a very narrow way.172 Immigration status was not a 
suspect classification requiring protection, even as the scope of 
Equal Protection does include undocumented people. The 
unanswered question left by Plyler is what would happen if a 
state attempted to discriminate against the undocumented by 
denying a “fundamental” right previously recognized as 
protected under the Equal Protection Clause? 
The list of Equal Protection fundamental rights is not a 
long one. The Supreme Court has protected parental rights,173 
the right to have one’s vote counted,174 the First Amendment,175 
 
169. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and 
Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723 (2010). 
170. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982). 
171. Id. at 223 (“Nor is education a fundamental right; a State need not 
justify by compelling necessity every variation in the manner in which 
education is provided to its population.”). 
172. See Motomura, supra note 169, at 1731-32 (“[The Plyler Court] 
relied so heavily on the involvement of children and education that no court 
has ever used it to overturn a statute disadvantaging unauthorized migrants 
outside the context of K-12 public education.”). 
173. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996). 
174. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)(If a fundamental right under the 
Equal Protection Clause however is the requirement to have one’s vote count, 
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the right against sterilization (or reproduction),176 the right to 
contraception177 and, most relevant to this discussion, the right 
to interstate travel.178 While both Equal Protection and 
substantive due process both use the term “fundamental” as 
pertaining to rights, the uses are very different in application. 
As Justice Stewart writes in response to Justice Harlan’s 
dissenting opinion in Shapiro, in deciding a fundamental right 
under Equal Protection, the Court “does not ‘pick out particular 
human activities, characterize them as ‘‘fundamental”, and 
give them added protection.’ To the contrary, the Court simply 
recognizes, as it must, an established constitutional right, and 
gives to that right no less protection than the Constitution 
itself demands.”179 Unlike substantive due process, which may 
be used to find un-enumerated rights under the guise of 
“liberty”, an Equal Protection fundamental right must already 
enjoy explicit constitutional protection. 
When courts described the right to travel as an individual 
right, they often referred to terms such as liberty180 and 
freedom of movement. In the context of international and intra-
state travel181 the courts explicitly grounded the right as a 
liberty interest. Restrictions on the ability to travel into and 
out of a state’s territory, or restrictions on where to choose to 
live, are intrinsically tied to liberty and another reason why it 
 
how could a non-citizen be afforded such protection when they can be 
excluded from suffrage altogether? The right under Bush v. Gore does not 
require universal suffrage; rather it requires that once a person votes, it must 
be counted equally to all the other votes.  And because non-citizens may be 
given suffrage and have throughout the nation’s history, it stands to reason 
that if they were allowed to vote, their vote must be counted equally.). 
175. Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
176. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
177. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972) (Though the Court did 
not need to decide that the right to contraceptives was a fundamental right 
as it struck the restriction under rational basis, the Court strongly indicated 
that it would have found Griswold’s prohibition as a fundamental right.). 
178. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
179. See id. at 642. 
180. It is important to note, that while “liberty” can have broad 
meanings, the references to the right to travel refer to a narrower definition 
concerning freedom from physical confinement. 
181. Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2002); Lutz v. 
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is a fundamental right that covers all people, including the 
undocumented. 
 
IV. Citizenship and the Right to Travel 
 
A careful reader of the right to travel cases will note that 
the word “citizen” appears throughout the Supreme Court’s 
decisions. The right to travel’s textual foundations include the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment; rights which non-citizens and the undocumented 
enjoy. However, the Court has also pointed to other textual 
foundations of the right: the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
of Article IV and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, both of which explicitly contain the 
term “citizens” and not the term “persons.” The latter status is 
one that an undocumented migrant may make a claim to, while 
the former status is out of reach. Moreover, Justice Taney, one 
of the first jurists to define the right to travel, explicitly denied 
this right to non-citizens and described it as a right unique to 
federal citizens.182 How can non-citizens, particularly the 
undocumented, be able to invoke a right that has been 
described as a “privilege or immunity of citizenship?” 
 
A. The Citizenship Divide  
 
Prior to the Court’s decision in Saenz, the right to travel as 
an exclusive citizenship right was merely a suggestion gleaned 
from the repeated use of the word “citizen” and various dicta 
from dissenting and concurring opinions. When presented with 
the question directly, the Supreme Court in Graham v. 
Richardson183 declined to decide the issue and instead relied 
upon the Equal Protection Clause. The perception of the right 
to travel changed dramatically after Saenz described the 
textual foundations as partially residing in the Comity Clause 
of Article IV and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The suggestion of citizenship 
 
182. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 283. 
183. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
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exclusivity transformed into an assumption. And yet, the Court 
never decided that the right to travel’s scope was limited to 
citizens or citizenship; California’s welfare scheme did not 
depend on the citizenship status of any of the incoming 
migrants. The revival of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Privileges or Immunities Clause was a strategic choice, 
designed to address California’s attempt to accomplish 
indirectly what the states in Shapiro could not do directly. 
Even assuming that Saenz’s identification of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause as a significant source of the right to travel 
is correct, it doesn’t decide the scope of the right to travel’s 
protection. The paucity of jurisprudence around the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause muddies the issue, and surprisingly 
enough, the Supreme Court has not expressly withheld a 
privilege or immunity of citizenship from non-citizens. An 
examination of constitutional citizenship, the historical origins 
of the right to travel, and finally the right’s expansion under 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause reveals 
that, regardless of its textual source, the right to travel 
protects non-citizens in the interior of the United States. 
Both Article IV’s “Privileges and Immunities” Clause and 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s “Privileges or Immunities 
Clause” contain the term “citizen”, which naturally leads to the 
assumption that non-citizen migrants, especially the 
undocumented, are outside of the respective clauses’ coverage. 
Justice O’Connor, in a concurring opinion, noted that Article 
IV’s clause would naturally be read to exclude non-citizens.184 
But before this next logical step can be taken, John Hart Ely’s 
warning about the scope of the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
should be heeded: 
 
“I certainly agree that we should defer to clear 
constitutional language: for one thing it is the 
best possible evidence of purpose. But when the 
usual reading is out of accord with what we are 
quite certain was the purpose, we owe it to the 
Framers and ourselves at least to take a second 
 
184. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 74 (1982). 
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look at the language.”185 
 
The fact that both clauses contain the term “citizen” does not 
necessarily limit or define the scope of the clauses’ protection. 
186 
The claim that the right to travel is an exclusive right for 
citizens faces several hurdles. First, citizens have few exclusive 
constitutional protections. 187 One scholar even deemed 
citizenship irrelevant in constitutional law.188 Second, the 
historical underpinnings of the right to travel extended to non-
citizens and “inhabitants.” The interweaving of “citizenship” 
and the right to travel was a strategy motivated by racial 
animus and fear of movement by free black men into slave 
states. And finally, even if the right to travel began as a 
privilege or immunity of citizenship, once it was given 
fundamental status under the Equal Protection Clause it would 
necessarily extend to non-citizens and the undocumented. 
 
B. The Thinness of Citizenship Rights 
 
When Alexander Bickel wrote that citizenship was “not 
important,” he did so with a specific worry in mind. As he 
explained, “Citizenship is a legal construct, an abstraction, a 
theory. No matter what safeguards it may be equipped with, it 
is at best something that was given, and given to some and not 
to others, and it can be taken away.”189 To him, the grounding 
of rights and constitutional protection based on the legal status 
of citizenship was dangerous and far less reliable than 
understanding that rights were dependent on “personhood.” He 
 
185. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 25(1980). 
186. An example of how the term “citizen” in the Constitution may 
extend to non-citizens can be seen in the context of Article III’s diversity 
jurisdiction requirement, which has been interpreted to include residents of a 
state who are not federal citizens. Similarly, despite references to “state 
citizenship,” citizens of Puerto Rico also enjoy Article IV protection. 
187. See Linda Bosniak, Constitutional Citizenship through the Prism of 
Alienage, 63 Ohio St. L.J. 1285, 1314 (2002) 
188. Alexander M. Bickel, Citizenship in the American Constitution, 15 
Ariz. L. Rev. 369 (1973). 
189. Id. at 387. 
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warned that “it always will be easier, to think of someone as a 
noncitizen than to decide that he is a nonperson . . . .”190 
Indeed, he was particularly concerned that a citizen-based 
rights theory would lead us to “a search for reciprocity and 
symmetry and clarity of uncompromised rights and 
obligations,” which in turn would lead to a theory of rights 
dependent on consent and contract.191 This warning is 
particularly prescient when considering the fate of 
constitutional protection for undocumented migrants in the 
United States.192 Constitutional jurisprudence has largely 
heeded Bickel’s concerns and disfavors making constitutional 
protection hinge on citizenship. 
Kurt T. Lash’s book The Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Privileges and Immunities of American Citizenship, makes two 
convincing arguments that seriously questions the role of the 
right to travel as a “citizenship” right. First and foremost, 
despite the common reading of Coryfeld that had included the 
right to travel as a right belonging to Article IV, Professor Lash 
demonstrated that ante-bellum common understanding of 
Coryfeld was much more limited. Despites its expansive dicta, 
Coryfeld and the other antebellum decisions on Article IV 
confirm an understanding that the “privileges and immunities” 
of citizenship did not refer to national or even fundamental 
rights, but rather only rights expressively protected by states 
to their own citizens.193 He also defended against the notion 
that the 14th Amendment’s privileges or immunities clause 
refers to unenumerated rights and instead articulates how the 
drafters and common understanding of the Privileges or 
Immunities clause during its passage refers to enumerated 
federal rights such as the first eight amendments, or the Bill of 
Rights. He specifically criticizes the Saenz court’s incorporation 
of the right to travel into the privileges or immunities clause.194 




192. See Peter J. Spiro, A New International Law of Citizenship, 105 AM. 
J. INT’L. L. 694 (2011). 
193. Kurt T. Lash, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges and 
Immunities of Citizenship, Cambridge University Press 2014, p. 23-37, 166-
167. 
194. Id. at 263 n.120. 
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the right to travel as a ‘citizenship’ right, there is considerable 
doubt whether such descriptions hold any analytical or even 
historical weight. 
A survey of constitutional rights explicitly reserved for 
those who have the status of citizenship yields a short list. If 
one includes unenumerated rights under Article IV or the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
the list gets considerably larger, but difficulties arise in 
deciding when an un-enumerated right should be reserved for 
citizens rather than for people in general. The Constitution 
requires certain office holders to be United States citizens, such 
as the President and Members of Congress, but notably does 
not require members of the Judiciary to be United States 
citizens. And while the public may consider suffrage itself a 
uniquely held right of citizens, it was denied to a large 
percentage of citizens, namely women, until relatively late in 
the history of the Constitution,195 and continues to be denied to 
minors and felons from certain states. Additionally, suffrage 
was occasionally given to non-citizens, even before the forming 
of the Republic and as a practice continued sporadically 
throughout the states.196 Non-citizens—even undocumented 
immigrants—may bring suit in state and federal courts, a 
privilege in common law that was exclusive to citizens.197 
Deciphering what constitutes a “citizenship” right exclusive to 
 
195. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875) (suffrage is not a 
privilege or immunity of citizenship).  Professor Amar argues that the 
suffrage right already existed for women prior to the Nineteenth 
Amendment, but that the amendment merely required its recognition. And 
yet, it is undeniable that non-landowners could not vote for many years, and 
that minor citizens and certain felons may also be denied the ability to vote. 
Notably most challenges to restrictions on voting invoke the Equal Protection 
Clause, i.e. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
196. Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, 
Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 
1391 (1993). Recently the City of New York is considering reviving this 
practice, see NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL, 
http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=803591&GUID=365
2CB45-9436-4D4F-ADE3-E17CE8A8AF28&Options=&Search=. 
197. Bolanos v. Kiley, 509 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1975);  Montoya v. 
Gateway Ins. Co., 401 A.2d 1102 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979); Janusis v. 
Long, 188 N.E. 228 (Mass. 1933); Catalanotto v. Palazzolo, 259 N.Y.S.2d 473 
(Sup. Ct. 1965). 
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citizens is not an easy task.198 It gets more confusing when 
trying to differentiate a separate question of when citizens can 
be treated differently than non-citizens. When are state and 
federal laws allowed to benefit citizens over non-citizens can 
muddle the question of what rights citizens have that non-
citizens do not. 
The Supreme Court has authorized laws that discriminate 
against non-citizens in terms of employment,199 land 
ownership,200 welfare benefits,201 and holding public office. But 
while disparate treatment is authorized, this is not the same as 
designating underlying benefits as constitutional rights 
exclusive to citizens. It may be constitutional to deny a non-
citizen the ability to receive welfare benefits, but it does not 
follow that welfare benefits are an exclusive right for citizens. 
Constitutionally permitted disparate treatment of non-citizens 
does not in and of itself indicate an underlying exclusive right 
of citizens.202 Citizenship status, outside of the “right” to hold 
certain federal offices, has not been a determinative factor in 
deciding most, if any, constitutional protections.203 Despite 
Justice Warren’s insistence that citizenship is a “status, which 
alone assures the full enjoyment of the precious rights 
conferred by our Constitution,” this has rarely been the case.204 
If the right to travel were a constitutional right exclusive to 
United States citizens, it would be a rare creature.205 
 
198. One such privilege which is not explicitly listed in the Constitution, 
may include the ability to invoke the protection of the nation in international 
disputes or when outside the territory of the United States. 
199. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). 
200. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). 
201. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). 
202. This is especially true when considering the scope of the Equal 
Protection Clause, which covers non-citizens and undocumented migrants 
alike. 
203. The recent controversy over the use of drones to kill U.S. Citizens 
on both enemy and domestic soil without a trial coupled with Senator McCain 
and Graham’s insistence that the Boston Marathon Bombers be denied 
Miranda warnings helps illustrate the decreased importance of citizenship 
and constitutional protection. In the Guantanamo cases, the Government 
pushed to use citizenship status as a dividing line for habeas coverage, but 
the Court ultimately rejected this bright line rule. 
204. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64-65 (1957) (Warren, J., 
dissenting). 
205. Perhaps the best example of an affirmative right enjoyed by United 
58http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/7
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The small weight given to citizenship status was seen early 
in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities 
jurisprudence when the Court decided the Slaughter-House 
Cases. The Slaughter-House Court placed the “Privileges or 
Immunities” phrase into a narrow box where it has been 
invoked rarely and, in the words of Professor Tribe, has been 
an “underutilized constitutional provision if ever there was 
one.” 206 Modern scholars such as Akil Reed Amar and Michael 
Kent Curtis have echoed previous scholars like Charles Black 
and Phillip Kurland who have rejected the Slaughter-House 
holding and instead attempted to revitalize citizenship as the 
anchor for constitutional protection by resurrecting the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.207 Scholars and occasionally jurists have criticized 
the road not taken and considered the elevation of the Due 
Process Clause and the evisceration of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause as a mistake of constitutional 
jurisprudence.208 And yet, this revival of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause comes with a price, for the Clause 
specifically lists “citizens” under its protection, while many of 
the substantive rights listed under the Bill of Rights list 
“person” or “people” as the scope of protection.209 For Amar, the 
exclusion of non-citizens was not a large concern and he 
considered them protected adequately by procedural 
fairness.210 Other scholars, such as Charles Black, Jr. worried 
 
States citizens exclusively is the right to avoid deportation. 
206. TRIBE, supra note 114, at 1325. 
207. CHARLES LUND BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 33-66 (1969); Michael Kent Curtis, Historical 
Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life after Death: The Privileges or Immunities of 
Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071 (2000); Philip B. Kurland, 
The Privileges or Immunities Clause: “Its Hour Come Round at Last?,” 1972 
WASH. U.L. REV. 405 (1972). 
208. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY, 161-62 (2012) (arguing that the 
incorporation doctrine was put off track by the Slaughter-House Cases); 
TRIBE, supra note 114, at 1317; and see Kurland, supra note 207, at 406. 
209. See Phillip Hamburger, Privileges or Immunities, 105 NW. U. L. 
REV. 61 (2011). 
210. Amar argues that the separate usage of “citizen” compared to 
“person” is a distinction between substantive rights and rights of procedural 
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about excluding non-citizens but argued that a strong pre-
emption doctrine could generally protect against state 
encroachment on protected rights.211 Until Saenz came along, 
the Slaughter-House Cases made the list of citizen privileges or 
immunities an exceedingly small list. And yet, the impact of 
Saenz was hardly felt outside of residency restrictions.212 
 
C. The Right to Travel’s Origins Included Residents and 
Inhabitants 
 
The lineage of the right to travel can be traced prior to the 
Constitution and was explicitly protected by Article IV of the 
Articles of Confederation. Article IV of the Articles of 
Confederation referenced the privileges and rights of citizens 
and yet, it bestowed them upon all of the “free inhabitants” of 
the various states. Moreover, when referencing the right to 
ingress and egress, Article IV explicitly gave this right to the 
“people” and did not restrict it to citizens.213 The Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787, the act that created territorial governments 
held by the United States and was part of the “Organic” law of 
rights, also had a provision that protected “travel.” The 
Ordinance made the navigable waters and the “carrying places” 
into “common highways” that were “forever free” to 
“inhabitants of the said territory”, “citizens of the United 
States”, and “those [citizens] of any other States that may be 
 
211. See BLACK, supra note 207. 
212. See Lawrence Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or 
Immunities Revival Portend the Future—or Reveal the Structure of the 
Present, 113 HARV. L. REV. 110 (1999). 
213. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, ART. IV, para. 1.  (“The better 
to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the 
people of the different states in this union, the free inhabitants of each of 
these states, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be 
entitled to all privileges or immunities of free citizens in the several states; 
and the people of each state shall have free ingress and regress to and from 
any other state, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and 
commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the 
inhabitants thereof respectively, provided that such restriction shall not 
extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into any state, to 
any other state, of which the owner is an inhabitant; provided also that no 
imposition, duties or restriction shall be laid by any state, on the property of 
the united states, or either of them.”). 
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admitted.”214 The Northwest Ordinance’s declaration of the 
scope and protection for travel should not be underestimated. 
The Ordinance existed prior to the Constitution’s own 
ratification and predated the Bill of Rights. It was 
instrumental in defining the scope and, perhaps, coverage of 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the 
Constitution and later the Privileges or Immunities Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.215 The explicit language of the 
Articles of Confederation and the Northwest Ordinance was 
not limited to citizens and extended to “people”, and 
“inhabitants” of the territories of the states at issue. The 
reference to “inhabitants” instead of “citizens” was not idle or 
written without contemplation of citizenship as both 
documents explicitly also used the citizen term in other areas. 
While historical examples of non-citizens claiming the right to 
travel may be lacking, there have been few express denials to 
non-citizens either.216 
 
214. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, reprinted in 1 U.S.C., at LV-LVII. 
(“The navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and 
the carrying places between the same, shall be common highways and forever 
free, as well to the inhabitants of the said territory as to the citizens of the 
United States, and those of any other States that may be admitted into the 
confederacy, without any tax, impost, or duty therefor.” The separation 
between “citizens of the United States” and “those of any other States”, is a 
curious one as the phrasing during a period where national citizenship had 
not been explicitly defined.). 
215. See Matthew J. Hegreness, An Organic Law Theory of the 
Fourteenth Amendment: The Northwest Ordinance as the Source of Rights, 
Privileges or Immunities, 120 YALE L. J. 1820 (2011). 
216. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971), which 
expressly left open the question of whether non-citizens could claim a right to 
travel. (“While many of the Court's opinions do speak in terms of the right of 
‘citizens’ to travel, the source of the constitutional right to travel has never 
been ascribed to any particular constitutional provision.”).  See Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 
758-59 (1966). The Court has never decided whether the right applies 
specifically to aliens, and it is unnecessary to reach that question here.”); But 
see, Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 64 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The 
word "Citizens" suggests that the Clause also excludes aliens.  See, e. g., 
id., at 177 (dictum); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-33, p. 411, n. 
18 (1978). Any prohibition of discrimination aimed at aliens or corporations 
must derive from other constitutional provisions.”); Doe v. Ga. Dep’t of Pub. 
Safety, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1374-75 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (denying claim based 
on undocumented status, but also assuming that if there was a 
“fundamental” right to travel that an undocumented migrant possessed, it 
would not prevent restrictions on driver’s licenses). 
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D. The Second Missouri Compromise and the Question of 
State Citizenship 
 
The best example of Alexander Bickel’s worries about the 
impermanence and discretionary nature of citizenship is the 
fate of free African-American men prior to the Civil War. The 
Dred Scott decision and Justice Taney’s attempt to withhold 
citizenship from African-American men based on their race 
illustrates the danger of using “citizenship” rather than 
personhood as an anchor for constitutional protection.217 The 
underlying logic of Justice Taney’s infamous Dred Scott ruling 
can be found in an early watershed moment of the antebellum 
period; Missouri’s admittance into the Union as a State. The 
Missouri Compromise, whereby Missouri became a 
slaveholding state after an agreement was reached on how to 
handle the Louisiana Territories is well-known American 
history. What is less-known is one of the first examples of a 
State’s attempt to exclude people from its territories, the 
Missouri Constitution of 1820, which led to the Second 
Missouri Compromise. 
On February 18, 1820, the United States Senate agreed to 
allow Missouri into the union after it held a constitutional 
convention and presented to Congress a state constitution.218 
The presented state constitution, however, contained a clause 
that required the Missouri legislation to pass laws to “prevent 
free negroes and mulattoes from coming to, and settling in, this 
state, under any pretext whatsoever.”219 The attempt to exclude 
free African-Americans and mulattoes caused an uproar in the 
divided Senate. One group of senators condemned the provision 
as unconstitutional and clearly “abhorrent” to the Federal 
Constitution; others either saw no such conflict, or preferred 
that the judiciary decide the issue. Eventually, a compromise 
was reached where Missouri’s Constitution was accepted with a 
 
217. Obviously the expansive aspect of birthright citizenship from the 
Citizenship Clause plays an important role, but it only serves to hide the fact 
that Citizenship is a legal construct while personhood is not.  A legal 
construct, even if constitutionally defined requires legal mechanism for 
support. Personhood does not. 
218. Missouri Enabling Act, ch. 22, §§1, 8, 3 Stat. 545, 548 (1820). 
219. MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 26. 
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strange caveat attached.220 Unfortunately, the agreed-to 
condition and the language used only served to create more 
confusion and eventually lead to the infamous Dred Scott 
decision. 
The Senate debated over the proposed Missouri 
Constitution centered on a variety of axis, but only two themes 
played an important role in this discussion. First, detractors of 
the proposed Constitution worried that it could exclude federal 
soldiers from entering Missouri to claim land due to them.221 
The Union Army famously had a large number of conscripts 
who were foreign born and non-citizens.222 By giving the 
example of U.S. soldiers as part of the excludable class, the 
Senators invoked concerns over federal power, as soldiers were 
given title and rights to land and if Missouri excluded them, 
then the federal power and promise would be threatened. 
The second important theme became the exclusion of free 
blacks and mulattoes who some considered citizens of the non-
slave owning states.223 Did Article IV of the United States 
Constitution, which guarantees privileges and immunities to 
citizens of other states, conflict with Missouri’s attempts to 
exclude free blacks and mulattoes? 
The contours of state citizenship were undefined during 
this period, and the Senate heard arguments that cast 
 
220. Res. of Mar. 2, 1821, 3 Stat. 645. (“[T]he offending MO 
constitutional clause] shall never be construed to authorize the passage of 
any law, and that no law shall be passed in conformity thereto, by which any 
citizen, of either of the States in this Union, shall be excluded from the 
enjoyment of any of the privileges and immunities to which such citizen is 
entitled under the Constitution of the United States.”) 
221. 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 47 (1820) (“Even if soldiers of the United 
States, people of this proscribed class cannot enter Missouri without violating 
the constitution of the State.”) Id. at 86. (“Sir, you not only exclude these 
citizens from their Constitutional ‘privileges and immunities,’ but also your 
soldiers of color, to whom you have given patents for land.”) Senator Holmes 
had tried to argue that U.S. soldiers were naturally exempted from the 
Missouri Constitution’s prohibition because the offending article did not use 
the word “all.” 
222. ELLA LONN, FOREIGNERS IN THE UNION ARMY AND NAVY (La. State 
Univ. Press, 1951). 
223. See Hamburger, supra note 209 (for a discussion of how the Second 
Missouri Compromise shifted the argument of whether free blacks were 
citizens based on the arguments supporting and denouncing Missouri’s 
proposed Constitution.); 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 86 (1820). 
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citizenship as a synonym with residence,224 a membership 
defined by the several states, and for some a status dependent 
on a set of rights.225 No agreement on state citizenship was 
agreed upon and the proposed Missouri Constitution was 
eventually accepted with a concession that it would not be used 
to pass laws that would prevent any citizen of any of the states 
from privileges and immunities protected by the 
Constitution.226 Essentially, the debate over the status of free 
blacks was punted to another time (and came to a head with 
Dred Scott) and left open whether the right to travel hinged 
upon state citizenship. While Missouri detractors assumed that 
at the very least citizens could not be denied the right to travel, 
they did not concede that only citizens would be protected.227 
Meanwhile, Missouri’s supporters viewed citizenship as 
something inherently unavailable to black people and thus 
were not able to avail themselves of either the privileges or the 
immunities of state citizenship, including the right to travel.228 
 
E. State Citizenship and its Continual Importance 
 
Eventually the Fourteenth Amendment and its Citizenship 
Clause decreased emphasis on state citizenship and its role in 
protecting constitutional rights. And yet, Article IV protections 
remain a vibrant area of constitutional law.229 While the 
question of what rights fall under its protections garner plenty 
of attention, courts have not paid much attention to what 
constitutes state citizenship for constitutional purposes other 
than to rely on domicile or residence.230 This is unsurprising as 
 
224. 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 93 (1820). 
225. Id. at 87. 
226. Res. of Mar. 2, 1821, 3 Stat. 645. (“[The offending MO constitutional 
clause] shall never be construed to authorize the passage of any law, and that 
no law shall be passed in conformity thereto, by which any citizen, of either of 
the States in this Union, shall be excluded from the enjoyment of any of the 
privileges and immunities to which such citizen is entitled under the 
Constitution of the United States.”) 
227. 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 48 (1820). 
228. One Senator tried to argue that the right of ingress was not 
included as a privilege and immunity of citizenship. See Remarks by Senator 
Holmes, 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 85 (1820). 
229. See McBurney v. Young, 133 S.Ct. 1709 (2013). 
230. See Pannil v. Roanoke Times Co., 252 F. 910 (W.D. Va. 1918) 
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the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause forbids states 
from denying citizenship to any United States citizen who 
decides to reside in a particular state. But it does leave some 
intriguing questions open, as some states have begun to 
recognize residency not just for lawful permanent residents, 
but also for the undocumented.231 Even though states cannot 
deny citizenship to federal citizens residing in their territory, 
there is no textual restriction on states granting citizenship to 
residents who are not U.S. citizens.232 When a state grants 
residency to a United States citizen, it automatically by 
constitutional mandate grants state citizenship. But what 
happens when a state grants residency to non-citizens, even 
the undocumented? The Second Missouri Compromise and the 
existence of a state citizenship distinct from federal 
citizenship233 leaves open the possibility that foreign born state 
residents could gain the benefit of state citizenship, even if 
they are denied federal citizenship. Would the granting of 
certain rights create citizenship as the senators supporting 
Missouri had argued? Or would a status or membership need to 
be explicitly granted before certain rights would be recognized? 
 
F. Aliens Who can Claim Privileges and Immunities of 
Citizens 
 
Linda Bosniak in The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of 
Contemporary Membership coined the phrase, “alien citizen,” 
as a radical response to the attacks on non-citizens’ ability to 
 
(discussing when a person may lose their state citizenship when they had no 
intent to travel back there). 
231. There are many examples that are relevant, from the granting of 
in-state tuition to undocumented students to giving driver’s licenses to the 
undocumented and most recently California’s decision to allow undocumented 
resident to practice law; Emily Green, Calif. Law Allows Undocumented 
Immigrants To Practice Law, NPR (Oct. 8, 2013, 3:25 AM) 
http://www.npr.org/2013/10/08/230320902/calif-law-allows-undocumented-
immigrants-to-practice-law. 
232. In New York a bill designed to do just that, is titled “New York is 
Home Bill” see http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-06-16/in-new-
york-a-bill-to-grant-undocumented-immigrants-state-citizenship 
233. See Hough v. Societe Electrique Westinghouse De Russie, 231 F. 
341, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (“One may be a citizen of the United States, and yet 
not be a citizen of any state.”). 
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claim protection under the Constitution. Professor Bosniak 
argued that a movement towards the Citizenship Clause as a 
source of rights does not necessarily lead to the exclusion of 
non-citizens from substantive constitutional protections. 
Citizenship, according to Professor Bosniak, is not a 
unitary or discrete term, but rather a bifurcated one. 
Citizenship can refer to status, in effect a definition of a certain 
type of membership, or it may refer to a set of baseline 
substantive rights.234 Bosniak’s divide, the status of citizenship 
versus the rights of citizenship, was an outgrowth of some prior 
scholarly work from the 1970s. She quotes John Hart Ely, who 
wrote, “there is a set of entitlements, ‘the Privileges or 
Immunities of citizens of the United States,’ which states are 
not to deny to anyone.”235 Ely later clarifies this as meaning 
that the Privileges or Immunities of United States citizens only 
defines the rights, rather than defining the people who hold 
them.236 Ely and later Bosniak argued that the term “citizen” 
with respect to the rights guaranteed by the clause could cover 
aliens as well as “status” citizens. This reading of the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause finds some support in an influential 
interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV. Justice Washington described the rights under that 
clause as, “in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, 
to the citizens of all free governments.”237 Aside from the right 
to travel, Justice Washington also referred to the right of equal 
taxation, the right to own land, and finally the right to sue in 
court.238 These separate rights described as privileges and 
 
234. LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF 
CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 14 (2008). 
235. Id. 
236. See id. at 90 (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A 
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 83 (1980)). 
237. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D.Pa. 1823) (no. 3,230). 
238. Justice Washington’s reference to the fundamental nature of the 
rights and how they may be enjoyed by all citizens of all free governments 
leaves open the question of whether the United States, or the individual 
states are required to protect the rights of citizens of other nations.  Because 
Justice Washington was describing how states must honor the fundamental 
rights of citizens of other states, it may be an easy jump to consider whether 
citizens of other nations should be included as well. However as Professor 
Lash has shown, and later the treatment by the Wheeler court, the listing of 
the rights may be a descriptive of rights already protected by states, rather 
66http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/7
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immunities of citizenship have been extended to non-citizens in 
various contexts already. While the right to own land has 
historically been dependent on legislative largess, the ability to 
sue in court has not so far been depended on a legislative act of 
consent. 
While Ely was willing to interpret the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause outside of the text, he was still missing a 
manner in which to include non-citizens under its protection. 
Kenneth Karst provided a way to bridge the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause to non-citizens by way of the Equal 
Protection Clause. In 1977, Professor Karst wrote the foreword 
for the November Harvard Law Review where he made a bold 
attempt to find the underpinnings of substantive equal 
protection.239 He proposed that Equal Protection meant ‘equal 
citizenship.’ He defined equal citizenship as a set of principles, 
which “presumptively forbids the organized society to treat an 
individual either as a member of an inferior or dependent caste 
or as a nonparticipant.”240 The reason Karst used “citizenship” 
as a starting point, rather than personhood, revealed itself 
when he described the role a citizen plays; a “citizen is a 
participant, a member of a moral community who counts for 
something in the community’s decision making processes.”241 
But most importantly, as Professor Bosniak points out, Karst’s 
use of the word “citizen” does not refer to the status of 
citizenry, but rather to the set of obligations that a nation has 
to its members.242 Karst’s citizenship referred to a baseline of 
substantive rights, one which guaranteed certain obligations of 
government over its members. 
Karst provided two main reasons why equal citizenship 
principles should be housed in the Equal Protection Clause 
rather than the Privileges or Immunities Clause. First, he 
 
than a list of rights that states must protect. Regardless the expansion to 
include non-citizens has already begun with several rights on Justice 
Washington’s list. 
239. Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term Foreword: Equal 
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977). 
240. Id. at 6. 
241. See id. at 8. 
242. Id. at 5 (Karst himself downplays citizenship as a mere legal status: 
“Citizenship, in its narrowest sense, is a legal status. . . . So viewed, 
citizenship is a constitutional trifle . . . .”). Id. 
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believed that the development of jurisprudence under Equal 
Protection created a solid foundation and provided modern 
judges with guidance on how to apply those principles. 
Secondly, he believed that the equal citizenship principle 
extends to non-status citizens. His argument on its 
applicability to non-citizens boiled down to the “broader 
principle of equal citizenship extends its core values to 
noncitizens, because for most purposes they are members of 
our society.”243 He goes on to note the strangeness of the term 
by noting, “[i]f it is paradoxical to suggest that a citizenship 
principle protects aliens, the paradox is one of rhetoric, not 
substance.”244 And yet, this transference of equal “citizenship” 
poses some severe problems. 
Lawrence Tribe described the Equal Protection Clause 
solution forwarded by Professor Karst, but was skeptical that 
“the Equal Protection Clause extended all the rights of national 
citizenship to aliens.”245 Historically aliens were treated 
differently than citizens, even with respect to the Equal 
Protection Clause, a result which Tribe found rational as 
“aliens and citizens may simply not be similarly situated.”246 
Linda Bosniak was also skeptical of Professor Karst’s 
wholesale use of the Equal Protection Clause. While she agreed 
with the focal point of rights should be on personhood, she 
argued that the concept of citizenship also extends to creating a 
“hard shell” of “national exclusivity and closure.” Citizenship 
doesn’t just describe rights, but also membership of a nation, 
which must inherently be exclusive. In order for citizenship to 
define membership and create boundaries, there must be some 
division between citizens and non-citizens for otherwise there 
is no limiting principle. In other words, “. . . although equal 
citizenship requires rights for everyone, it also tolerates, and 
perhaps even demands, the legal exclusion of certain 
territorially present non-nationals for some purposes . . . .”247 
Karst himself tried to identify the rights denied to non-citizens 
under citizenship by declaring that insofar the United States is 
 
243. Id. at 45. 
244. Id. at 46. 
245. TRIBE, supra note 114, at 1375. 
246. Id. 
247. BOSNIAK, supra note 234, at 100. 
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a “political” community, then perhaps political rights may 
properly be denied to non-citizens. And yet, this formulation is 
vague and laden with value judgments.248 
Commentators have used descriptors such as 
“personhood”, “membership” or “political” as a means to decide 
which rights are properly denied to non-citizens and which 
ones should be included. And yet these descriptions are difficult 
to distinguish from value judgments about citizenship in 
general. For example, Amy Motomura argued that non-citizens 
should be allowed to sit on juries and the New York Council 
debated extending voting privileges to non-citizens. These 
modern arguments mirror the fundamental question of 
citizenship itself; representation and membership for those 
affected. As Professor Tirres has shown, there had been a long 
history of restrictions on land ownership for non-citizens, and 
yet this was based on a different political concept of 
sovereignty.249 While many alien land laws are still on the 
books, Professor Tirres and others have argued that their 
existence should be considered outdated precisely because the 
American concept of sovereignty has shifted. What exactly 
qualifies as a “political” right if suffrage does not, and land 
ownership may? If a right has already been extended by the 
Equal Protection Clause, then it would stand to reason that it 
could be extended to non-citizens using the same mechanism. 
 
G. The Equal Protection Clause Expanded the Scope of the 
Right to Travel 
 
The history and application of the right to travel mirrors 
Professor Karst’s view on “citizenship” rights that can be 
extended through the Equal Protection Clause. Under 
Professor Karst’s view, a privilege or immunity of citizenship 
 
248. Both Tribe and Karst mention suffrage as an example that could be 
denied to non-citizens, but as explained earlier suffrage is not a privilege or 
immunity protected by the 14th Amendment’s Privilege or Immunities 
Clause. 
249. Allison B. Tirres, Property Outliers: Non-Citizens, Property Rights 
and State Power, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 77, 91(2012) (“Land was granted in 
exchange for allegiance, including the obligation to provide military 
protection for the kind or queen and by extension, the lord. Property was thus 
a key determinant of allegiance and loyalty.”). 
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could be granted to a non-citizen by applying the Equal 
Protection Clause. Or as Tribe described “the Equal Protection 
Clause, so the argument goes, by prohibiting discrimination in 
legal rights among all persons-citizens and persons alike-would 
. . . secure the ‘privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States’ to all persons within the jurisdiction of a 
particular state.”250 While it may stretch Equal Protection too 
far to extend all privileges or immunities to non-citizens, 
particular attention should be paid to those privileges or 
immunities that have already been made subject to Equal 
Protection analysis as a “fundamental” right. The right to 
travel is one such privilege or immunity. 
When the Court in Shapiro decided that the right to travel 
prevented California and other states from denying welfare 
benefits, it did so by applying the Equal Protection Clause. And 
yet, the Court did not try and create a suspect classification for 
the poor, or those who needed public benefits; instead the 
Court ruled that residency classifications were unconstitutional 
because it burdened a “fundamental right—the “right to 
travel.” The Court was reluctant during the Shapiro case to 
explain the textual foundations of the right to travel, and yet 
nevertheless “recognized that the nature of our Federal Union 
and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to 
require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length 
and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules or 
regulations . . . .”251 By recognizing the fundamental right, 
without having to anchor it, the Court was able to find a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause without relying on the 
underlying explicit constitutional authority. This was 
important, for while the Fourteenth Amendment’s provision 
provided for power of enforcement against the states, other 
constitutional rights may or may not have been applicable 
against the states at all. Incorporation of substantive rights 
were (and still are) controlled by references to “due process,” a 
phrase that had to be separately weighed. Shapiro’s end-
around was used earlier by United States v. Guest when the 
Court ruled that the federal conspiracy statute covered 
 
250. TRIBE, supra note 114, at 1325. 
251. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969). 
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attempts to interfere with the right to travel by private actors 
because of the right’s fundamental nature.252 The extension of 
the right to travel through the Equal Protection Clause was 
key. In doing so, the Court signaled that the right to travel was 
of a fundamental nature such that it should be enjoyed by all 
persons and not limited to its original ancestry as a citizenship 
right. 
The framework described by Kenneth Karst can be applied 
to the jurisprudence of the right to travel.253 Once a privilege or 
immunity of citizenship has been extended by use of the Equal 
Protection Clause a strong presumption should be assumed 
that it should become applicable to all persons, including non-
citizens. Notably254 Equal Protection does not completely 
prevent a state from denying the right to travel, or other 
fundamental rights to a person, but it does mandate that such 
a denial survive strict scrutiny. 
 
V. Self-Deportation Laws and the Right to Travel 
 
Establishing that states have little ability to restrict 
migration, because of concerns of comity and equal protection is 
a starting point. Despite various state legislatures making 
their intentions of restricting migration clear and prominent, 
the implementation of the policy requires examination.255 
When does a law that regulates non-citizens become a law that 
attempts to drive them out of the state or prevent their entry? 
At what point does a law regulating activity of non-citizens 
under a state’s police power become one that restricts 
 
252. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966). 
253. Justice Brennan in the DeSoto and Zobel cases explicitly referred to 
principles of equal citizenship perhaps in a nod to Professor Karst’s 
arguments. 
254. While the Court has also recognized suffrage as a fundamental 
right protected by the Equal Protection Clause, the reasoning here does not 
force the extension of suffrage to non-citizens, an unintuitive and for many an 
unacceptable result. Suffrage is of a fundamentally different nature than the 
right to travel, not only is it not a ‘privilege or immunity’ of citizenship, but it 
is also mentioned and handled by section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). 
255. This American Life: Reap What You Sow, Chicago Public Radio 
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migration and runs afoul of the right to travel? 
 
A. Deciding when Discrimination Affects Migration 
 
The question of when and how a state law violates the 
right to travel has been a puzzle throughout the right’s long 
history.256 However, the Supreme Court has provided some 
useful guidance. The right to travel can be infringed upon in 
three ways: the first is a “direct obstruction” to ingress and 
egress, this has included criminalization, and direct taxation of 
people traveling into the state. The second and third method is 
the use of discrimination against travelers and new residents of 
a state. Direct obstruction on the ability or forced exit does not 
require much additional analysis. However the use of 
discriminating treatment to control travel and migration does. 
States may not treat travelers differently because they are not 
residents, and may not discriminate against “new” residents for 
being new.257 A right to travel that ignores discrimination 
would be neutered as states could control migration by 
disparate treatment. The Supreme Court has provided 
guidance on to determine when a state controls migration by 
using discrimination 
States cannot create conditions based on disparate 
treatment that would drive a population out or prevent certain 
groups from entering. And yet, individuals or groups may 
decide to move into states or leave states for a host of reasons 
and states are not forced to take into every possible incentive. 
Taxation provides an obvious example. States are not required 
to homogenize their taxation schemes even though many 
people can base their decisions to live or leave a state based on 
taxation.258 Nevertheless the Supreme Court has not shied 
away from striking down unequal treatment that has the 
 
256. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 499, 501-504 (1999). 
257. Article IV purports to protect travelers while the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause protects residents. 
258. Paul L. Caron, Did Taxes Help Drive Dwight Howard to Sign with 
the Houston Rockets Rather Than the L.A. Lakers?, TAXPROF BLOG (Jul. 6, 
2013), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2013/07/did-taxes.html; 
though some limitations on taxation may exist; see David Schmudde, 
Constitutional Limitations on State Taxation of Nonresident Citizens, 1999 
L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 95, 95-167 (1999). 
72http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/7
  
886 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:2 
potential to exclude people. 
Prior to Saenz, state legislators were often explicit in their 
desires to affect migration policy. In Shapiro, the states 
admitted that they intended to prevent poor people from 
migrating into their states for welfare benefits. In Maricopa, 
Arizona explicitly declared their intention to prevent people 
from moving in to use free medical services. When state 
legislators made public their intentions to prevent migration, it 
was easy for the Court to declare such intentions as 
unconstitutional, even if they would serve a legitimate purpose 
such as preventing financial ruin of a program.259 Just as with 
other Equal Protection claims, a clear animus, or in this 
situation a clear purpose to drive people out of the state, would 
violate the right to travel.260 
When states and legislators are less clear on their 
intentions, the Court must examine the conditions imposed by 
state legislators. In striking down the denial of welfare benefits 
in Shapiro and free medical care in Maricopa-the Court 
couched these benefits as “vital” or as a “basic necessity of 
life.”261 When compared to residency for tuition at colleges, the 
Court stated that “higher tuition fees to nonresident students 
cannot be equated with granting of basic subsistence.”262 The 
Court was attempting to balance the level of harm imposed by 
the state.263 It is not surprising that courts in Maricopa and 
Shapiro both found that the denial of “basic necessities of life” 
to be coercive and penalizing people for choosing to migrate. 
Imposing conditions that are reasonably calculated to force 
migration should be considered a difficult standard to meet 
 
259. See Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250 (1974). 
260. The animus test from Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. 
Dev. Corp, 429 U.S. 252 (1977) should apply be applied to the right to travel 
context. 
261. See Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250, 258 (1974). 
262. Id. at 260 quoting Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 238 
(Minn. 1970)) (the court could be forgiven for some hyperbole for denial of 
benefits that would result in death may be protected by substantive due 
process and not require the right to travel). 
263. Zobel would seem to create a stark contrast, but the majority 
refused to see the case as one of the right to travel, and the concurring 
opinion by Justice Brennan recognized that it would have little effect on 
migration. Only Justice O’Connor’s concurrence framed the issue squarely 
under a right to travel. 
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under normal circumstances. A higher tax burden, or more 
onerous licensing requirements are unlikely to meet this 
hurdle. Even restrictions on where to live, as long as 
alternatives are plentiful, may not trigger strict scrutiny. 
Nevertheless a denial of essential benefits, which need not 
themselves be constitutionally mandated, does trigger scrutiny 
under a right to travel analysis. 
 
B. Self-Deportation Laws as Impermissible Burdens on the 
Right to Travel 
 
State self-deportation laws run afoul of the right to travel 
under three circumstances. The first is the purpose and intent 
of the law was to affect the migration of people into and out the 
state or municipality. Despite having clear borders, states have 
no legitimate interest in protecting their borders against 
people. The second method is for states to directly obstruct the 
entry of non-citizens into their territory or directly force them 
out. This can be accomplished with taxes, though most state 
self-deportation laws avoid the taxation issue and go straight 
to criminalizing people for their presence. The final method for 
a self-deportation law to violate the right to travel, would be to 
deny essential key services or benefits to non-citizens such that 
they would be dissuaded from entering or forced to leave.264 
The state legislatures that passed self-deportation laws 
such as HB 56, SB1070, or the municipalities that passed the 
ordinances in Farmers Branch and the City of Hazelton were 
initially not shy about their intentions to force migration out of 
 
264. Professor Delaney in proposing a Dormant Commerce Clause 
analysis essentially reaches a similar conclusion by noting that, “A Dormant 
Commerce Clause–type approach would require an expansion of this 
principle to regulations affecting access to other basic goods—such as 
housing, education, or health care—the denial of which threatens an 
immigrant’s ability to survive as a new resident. Preventing aliens from 
accessing these types of goods can be considered tantamount to denying them 
entrance, thus violating the national interest in a uniform system of 
immigration.” Delaney, at 1845 supra note 134. This is unsurprising given 
the intertwined nature of the right to travel and the Dormant Commerce 
clause.  However, it should be noted that the “effects” test proposed by 
Professor Delaney, would not work, as the Court struck down a similar 
attempt under the right to travel calling it an “actual deterrence” 
requirement. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 504. 
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their area. Scott Beason openly declared that HB 56 was 
designed to “fix” the undocumented problem, and to do so by 
driving them out of the state. But just as California eventually 
stopped referring to their attempt to change welfare benefits as 
a migration tool, the authors of self-deportation laws may also 
stop publicly declaring their intentions to drive the 
undocumented out. In which case, relying on legislative intent 
or purpose to analyze state deportation laws may not prove 
fruitful. 
The “self-deportation” laws operate on several different 
levels. The laws criminalize the presence of undocumented 
migrants, usually in the form of requiring documentation to 
prove lawful status. The laws criminalize activities that are 
essential to residence; such as employment and the renting of 
an abode. Finally, the laws also discourage or invalidate 
interactions that undocumented have with other residents of 
the state, for instance preventing the transportation or 
harboring of undocumented migrants and the voiding of 
contracts entered into with the undocumented. 
Laws, such as SB 1070 that criminalize the mere presence 
of the undocumented are a clear example of a direct migration 
control. Threatening a person with loss of liberty for the mere 
act of entering into the territory is the hallmark of state action 
forbidden by the right to travel. In fact, other than the Missouri 
Constitution of 1820, no state has attempted to test the right to 
travel in this manner. 
 Laws that restrict certain activities, such as employment 
and rent present a more difficult challenge. Employment 
restrictions have been difficult to analyze using the pre-
emption and equal protection analysis, and prove to be no 
easier when placed against the right to travel.265 However, 
preventing a person from seeking any employment could be 
interpreted as forcing a person to leave the state. While the 
denial of employment for specific jobs for non-citizens may not 
run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause directly,266 the 
 
265. Compare DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), with Traux v. 
Rauch, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915). 
266. Compare Amback v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (denying non-
citizens employment as public teachers upheld), with Application of Griffiths, 
413 U.S. 717 (1973) (forbidding the exclusion of non-citizens from being 
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Supreme Court has found that denying employment on a 
blanket basis can run afoul of the right to travel.267 While the 
denial of specific jobs or specific licensing requirements would 
not be enough to compel the expulsion of the undocumented, a 
universal ban on all types of employment is coercive enough to 
violate the right to travel.268 
Similarly, ordinances that prevent the undocumented from 
renting an apartment also run afoul of the right to travel. 
Forcing the choice to either become homeless or break the law 
would drive reasonable people to leave the state or 
municipality. Federal courts have described such choices as 
forcing people to leave the area. In the Hazleton case, the Third 
Circuit in examining Hazelton’s rental restrictions noted, “[I]t 
is difficult to conceive of a more effective method of ensuring 
that persons do not enter or remain in a locality than by 
precluding their ability to live in it.”269 In the en banc decision 
by the Fifth Circuit in Farmers Branch, the Court similarly 
described the rental ordinances as creating circumstances such 
that, “because no alien with an unlawful status will be able to 
obtain the basic need of shelter through a rental contract. 
Illegal aliens will therefore have no recourse but to self-deport 
from Farmers Branch.”270 Compare the decision in Maricopa 
County that forbade Arizona from withholding “a basic 
necessity of life,” with the Farmers Branch decision that the 
rental ordinance “precludes aliens from obtaining an essential 
human requirement.”271 The perspective that rental contracts 
are necessary for the basic requirement of shelter may also go a 
long way to explain why land ownership can be denied to non-
 
lawyers). 
267. Att’y Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986) (striking 
down an employment classification for veterans who served while a resident 
of New York versus another state). 
268. Once again this does not prevent a federal scheme that would 
prevent employment. An open question would remain as to whether federal 
authorization could allow states to adopt policies that prevent the 
employment of the undocumented. For instance a federal mandatory E-Verify 
program would require additional analysis. 
269. Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 620 F.3d 170, 220-21 ( 3d Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Bonito Boats v. Thundercraft Boats, 489 US. 141, 160 (1989)). 
270. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 
524, 541 (5th Cir. 2013) (Reavley, J., concurring). 
271. Id. at 541. 
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citizens while rental restrictions cannot apply to the 
undocumented.272 
While the renters’ and employment provisions have gotten 
judicial scrutiny in a variety of courts, the provisions that test 
basic social and economic interactions has only been tested in a 
lawsuit challenging Alabama’s HB 56.273 HB 56 went a step 
further than the previous self-deportation laws by voiding 
contracts entered into by the undocumented and by eliminating 
governmental services. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
struck down these provisions citing pre-emption, but did so by 
describing them as “extraordinary and unprecedented would be 
an understatement, as it imposes a statutory disability 
typically reserved for those who are so incapable as to render 
their contracts void or voidable. Essentially, the ability to 
maintain even a minimal existence is no longer an option for 
unlawfully present aliens in Alabama.”274 If Alabama could 
void all contracts entered with undocumented migrants, it 
would effectively shut down their ability to conduct basic 
economic activities. 
Self-deportation laws also criminalize normal social 
interactions with the undocumented. While federal law has 
anti-harboring statutes that prevent people from concealing or 
transporting undocumented migrants, courts have limited 
criminal liability for conduct that “substantially facilitates” an 
undocumented person remaining.275 State laws that criminalize 
the transportation or harboring of the undocumented have no 
such requirement and punish conduct that could include 
inviting an undocumented migrant for dinner, or carpooling 
with one to work. These laws reach into normal social 
interactions and punish any contact with the undocumented. 
Most courts have struck down these provisions after comparing 
them to the federal analogues and finding them an “untenable 
expansion.”276 Just as the contractual provision of HB 56 
attempts to cut off economic interactions of the undocumented, 
 
272. This may answer the conundrum posed by Tirres, supra note 249. 
273. ALA. CODE § 31-13-1 (1975). 
274. United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1293 (11th Cir. 2012). 
275. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 
524, 576 n.20 (5th Cir. 2013) (Reavley, J., concurring). 
276. Id. at 531 n.9. 
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the expansion of transportation or harboring provisions 
attempt to cut off all social interactions. Under both scenarios, 
they would render it nearly impossible for the undocumented to 
function in society and therefore force them out of the 
municipality or state. 
If instead of employing pre-emption, the Farmers Branch¸ 
Fremont¸ and Alabama courts had instead employed the right 
to travel, much of the analysis would remain intact. All three 
courts would have examined the state self-deportation laws 
and ruled that their purposes and results if enacted would 
drive the undocumented out of the state or municipality. The 
difference in employing a right to travel lens would be such a 
conclusion would be determinative, any additional conjecture of 
this effect on national immigration policy would be 
unnecessary. 
The decisions in Plyler and Arizona could have similarly 
been simplified. Texas’s discrimination against undocumented 
children could have been struck down as an attempt to 
withhold an essential benefit that unconstitutionally burdened 
the right to travel, just as the denial of free emergency room 
services in Maricopa or welfare benefits in Shapiro. SB 1070’s 
attempt to drive the undocumented from Arizona and create 
their own state migration policy could have been ruled as a 
threat to comity between the states, federal power and most 
importantly a violation of a fundamental right that has been 




Justice Brandeis famously declared, “It is one of the happy 
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state 
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country.” 277 Implicit in Brandeis’ vision of state sovereignty are 
two assumptions, that such experimentations do not imperil 
the rest of the country and that people have the freedom to 
decide which states they may choose to become a member of. 
 
277. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1982) 
(dissenting opinion by Justice Brandeis). 
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Self-deportation laws violate both assumptions of Justice 
Brandeis’ vision for state sovereignty. 
Controlling the migration of people is an awesome power, 
one that implicates both individual freedom and national 
sovereignty. Nations and sovereignties may employ a variety of 
means to control migration and membership. The federal 
government may create incentives for entry on the national 
level. At the same time, the federal government wields the 
awesome power of deportation, a power that can separate 
families, deny people their freedom and liberty and even 
interfere with basic constitutional and human rights if wielded 
fairly. States however only have the power to entice entry.278 
They do not have any power to drive or deny entry into their 
borders.279 
The right to travel restriction against state control of 
migration confirms Professor Motomura’s vision of a federal 
project to create membership and identity. Undocumented 
immigrants are undocumented because the federal government 
has either chosen to exclude them, but failed to remove them, 
or the government has not had a chance to decide the matter 
because of deception or evasion by the migrants themselves. 
But when the federal government fails to act, states and 
municipalities do not have room to exercise their judgment. 
Michael Walzer advocated that a strong national border is 
necessary to prevent the creation of a “thousand petty 
fortresses”280 but it is the right to travel that prevents states 
and municipalities from building walls and gates to those 
 
278. Zobel 457 U.S. at 67-68 (concurring opinion by Justice Brennan)  
(“A State clearly may undertake to enhance the advantages of industry, 
economy, and resources that make it a desirable place in which to live. In 
addition, a State may make residence within its boundaries more attractive 
by offering direct benefits to its citizens in the form of public services, lower 
taxes than other States offer, or direct distributions of its munificence. 
Through these means, one State may attract citizens of other States to join 
the numbers of its citizenry.”) 
279. The one-sided nature of the right to travel; restricting states from 
denying entry or forcing exit but allowing them to encourage migration 
affords it an advantage over pre-emption analysis.  While states that 
encourage protection of the undocumented may suffer under a preemption 
analysis, not such infirmary would occur under the right to travel framework. 
280. The term was coined in, Michael Walzer, SPHERES OF JUSTICE, A 
DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 39 (1983), to describe the dangers of 
not having a strong national border. 
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searching for a home, or a place of sanctuary. 
 
80http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/7
